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I. INTRODUCTION 
Food safety is occupying a place in the spotlight now more than ev-
er, with a crescendo of recent food scares awakening the American con-
sumer to the dangers from which they are not being adequately protect-
ed, and further resulting in new legislation like the FDA Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA), a mandate from Congress and the Presi-
dent.
1
 With this new focus on food safety comes an awareness that more 
change must soon follow, as law and policy struggle to catch up with 
years of regulatory neglect. The courts, other agencies, or Congress— 
who steps in when agencies fail to protect the U.S. food supply? Current-
ly, food regulation is fractured, with authority split among a few agen-
cies. While the courts are attempting to step in to fill the gaps, they are 
reaching the limits of their judicial review powers. Accordingly, the time 
is ripe to develop a new public policy approach for ensuring food safety 
in the United States. 
These issues come most dramatically to the forefront in the area of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Unlike traditional methods of 
selective breeding that have been used for centuries, genetically modi-
fied (GM) crops are created when the DNA of one organism is inserted 
into another, causing the target trait to be expressed in that non-related 
species at the cellular level throughout the plant, including the fruit or 
vegetable and the component ingredients that become part of a variety 
of food products. Most commonly, GM plants are engineered to with-
stand a weed-killing herbicide, Roundup, sold by Monsanto along with 
the herbicide-resistant varieties of soybeans, canola, cotton, corn, radic-
chio, rice, and sugar beet.
2
 In addition, genes derived from a bacterium 
in the soil used as an insecticide, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), have been 
inserted into crops to induce the plant to produce a toxin against certain 
insects, producing Bt-corn, Bt-cotton, Bt-potatoes, Bt-rice, and 
Bt-tomatoes.
3
 Meanwhile in the U.S., unlike in Europe, Japan, and most 
of the international community, these crops are not subject to special 
regulatory scrutiny in spite of their novel properties. Instead, they are 
                                                     
 1. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 
3885 (2011) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006)) (amending the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (1938)). See Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of 
the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 
66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 353 (2011) [hereinafter Strauss, FSMA] (analyzing the components 
and significance of the recently enacted FSMA and proposing a reassessment of GM regula-
tion in view of this new proactive approach). 
 2. William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant 
Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at B1. 
 3. See Debra M. Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 167–68 
(2006) [hereinafter Strauss, Importing Caution] (explaining this technology and examples of 
GM crops). 
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welcomed by the government for their touted benefits and are widely 
adopted by farmers.
4
 
As a result, the most recent statistics show that 93% of soybeans,
5
 
86% of corn,
6
 and 93% of cotton
7
 planted in 2010 were genetically modi-
fied; GM canola, squash, papaya, alfalfa, and sugar beet were also wide-
ly planted.
8
 Seventy-nine GM crops were granted non-regulated status 
as of May 12, 2010, including fifteen species as well as smaller-volume 
crops such as beets, chicory, plums, and flax.
9
 In fact, a vast majority of 
products on U.S. grocery shelves now contain GM ingredients.
10
 Even 
Whole Foods Market, which attempts to stock natural foods, acknowl-
edges that this proliferation makes stocking only non-GMO products 
difficult. “Until there’s federal government mandated labeling of GMO 
ingredients, there’s no way to tell if packaged products contain GMO 
ingredients,” admits the quality standards coordinator for Whole Foods 
Market.
11
 “Our approach is to work in the spirit of partnership with our 
suppliers . . . to encourage them to take active steps to avoid GMO in-
gredients.”12 
                                                     
 4. Id. at 174–76 (discussing the U.S. regulatory scheme in comparison to the in-
ternational approach, which scrutinizes the human health and environmental risks as part 
of its precautionary approach). 
 5. USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED (GE) SOYBEAN 
VARIETIES BY STATE AND UNITED STATES (2010–2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Biotech 
Crops/alltables.xls (select “Soybeans” worksheet). 
 6. USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED (GE) CORN 
VARIETIES BY STATE AND UNITED STATES (2010–2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Biotech 
Crops/alltables.xls (select “Corn” worksheet). 
 7. USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED (GE) UPLAND 
COTTON VARIETIES BY STATE AND UNITED STATES (2010–2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data 
/BiotechCrops/alltables.xls (select “Cotton” worksheet). 
 8. INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, ISAAA Brief 
41-2009: Executive Summary, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/41/executiv 
esummary/default.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (documenting rise in GM plantings in the 
first fourteen years, from 1996 to 2009). 
 9. Keith Aoki, Food Forethought: Intergenerational Equity and Global Food Sup-
ply – Past, Present, and Future, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 399, 462 (2011). See, e.g., Petitions of 
Nonregulated Status Granted or Pending by APHIS as of October 12, 2011, USDA ANIMAL & 
PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/not_reg.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (listing eighty-seven crops that have been granted non-regulated 
status). 
 10. A conservative estimate by the Grocery Manufacturers Association estimated 
that 75% of all processed foods in the United States in 2005 contained a GM ingredient, in-
cluding almost every product with a corn or soy ingredient and some containing canola or 
cottonseed oil. See, e.g., Americans Clueless About Gene-Altered Foods, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7277844/ns/health-genetics/t/americans-clueles 
s-about-gene-altered-foods/ (statement of Stephanie Childs, Grocery Manufacturers of Amer-
ica). Considering the exponential increase in GM plantings since then, one would expect the 
number to be even higher today. 
 11. Monica Eng, Debate Rages Over Labeling of Foods with Genetically Modified 
Ingredients, LA TIMES, June 2, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/02/business/la-fi-
gmo-20110602. 
 12. Id. 
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The lack of required labeling for GMOs in the United States is par-
ticularly troubling to opponents as an ethical matter because consumers 
have no way of knowing what products contain GM ingredients and thus 
have been deprived of the rights of choice and informed consent.
13
 More-
over, this policy conflicts with other U.S. labeling requirements such as 
nutrition and ingredients content. Increased consumer awareness of this 
fact has generated dissatisfaction with the lack of federal regulation. A 
recent poll by ABC News reported that 92% of the American public 
wants the federal government to require mandatory labeling on GM 
foods.
14
 If it were labeled, 55% currently say they would avoid such 
foods, including 62% of women, who do most of the food shopping.
15
 
Nearly half of adults, 47%, also say they would try to avoid hormone- or 
antibiotic-treated food if it were labeled.
16
 
Critics of this technology express concern about possible health 
risks and environmental hazards such as “soil and plant nutrient losses, 
contamination of non-[GM] crops, and increased pesticide use.”17 Al-
ready, incidents of contamination have led to numerous lawsuits by tra-
ditional and organic farmers for their economic loss and injury.
18
 Yet 
instead of responding to the public, the FDA relies on the companies 
that have a financial interest in growing biotech crops to assess their 
safety. The FDA has stated that “[u]ltimately, it is the food producer 
who is responsible for assuring safety” of GM foods.19 But this reliance 
on the industry for assessing risks is misplaced, as evidenced by a Mon-
santo statement: 
                                                     
 13. See Debra M. Strauss, Defying Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically 
Modified Plants, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 7–19 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Ethical Implica-
tions] (discussing the failed promise of this technology and presenting an ethical framework 
in support of labeling and monitoring). 
 14. David Morris, Poll: Modified Foods Give Consumers Pause, ABC NEWS (July 15, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=86497&page=1. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. Consumers also favor voluntary labeling: 51% of the U.S. consumers sur-
veyed indicate they are attracted to foods with labels saying they are not genetically modified 
and 46% say the same for food labeled as hormone- and antibiotic-free. Id.  
 17. Eng, supra note 11; see, e.g., Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 169–
76 (discussing risks of GMOs). 
 18. See Debra M. Strauss, We Reap What We Sow: The Legal Liability Risks of Ge-
netically Modified Food, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. BUS. 149, 155–68 (2010) [hereinafter Strauss, 
Legal Liability Risks] (analyzing through lawsuits arising from these incidents the legal 
liability risks of GMOs and concluding that the interests of seed companies, farmers, and 
consumers will converge in this area to mandate greater certainty and safety). 
 19. Eng, supra note 11 (quoting written statement by FDA to the Chicago Tribune); 
see also Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,991 (May 29, 1992). FDA continued by stating, “FDA has long regarded it to be a prudent 
practice for producers of foods using new technologies to work cooperatively with the agency 
to ensure that the new products are safe and comply with applicable legal requirements. It 
has been the general practice of the food industry to seek informal consultation and coopera-
tion, and this practice should continue with respect to foods produced using the newer tech-
niques of genetic modification.” Id.  
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Experts in the field of food safety are satisfied that [the cur-
rent] approach is sufficient and reliable to assure the genet-
ically modified crops are as safe as their conventional counter-
parts. This expert community does not see a need and thus 
does not recommend long-term tests in humans or animals in 
order to establish food safety.
20
 
Most troubling, the short- and long-term risks to human health and the 
environment are apparently not being studied in the United States, alt-
hough some negative results are being discovered in other countries.
21
 
Under the Obama administration, an “unprecedented number” of 
GM crops are being approved for deregulation, including ethanol corn, 
alfalfa, and sugar beets.
22
 In the absence of regulatory restraint or even 
extensive study by the governmental agencies responsible, consumer 
and environmental groups have been increasingly turning to the courts 
to contain the spread of GMOs. However, this approach may not prove 
to be the most effective or efficient in the long run, as a closer examina-
tion of these cases and other developments reveals. 
In studying the dilemma of food safety in the area of GMOs, Part II 
of this article first examines the evidence of agency inaction and criti-
cisms, particularly of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), in the regula-
tory process. In Part III, this article first analyzes the court cases that 
have been initiated by consumer and environmental groups against the-
se agencies, and then addresses the limits of their judicial review. Part 
IV explores action from Congress, whose oversight is required, and legis-
lative initiatives that could provide guidance as well as a shift in this 
area. Part V then discusses the roles of trade associations acting in their 
industries’ best interests, suppliers standing up for non-GM compo-
nents, and consumer-driven demands such as organics and non-GMO 
sales. With these broad constituencies in mind, Part VI presents pro-
posals for a new multilateral, unified approach capitalizing on a broader 
involvement of these other branches of government and indus-
try/academic partners with expertise to leverage knowledge and infor-
mation. Accordingly, Part VII concludes that the time is ripe to establish 
a dedicated and specific statutory response for GM crops and GMOs in 
food. Doing so is the next logical step in building upon the progress al-
                                                     
 20. Eng, supra note 11 (alteration in original). 
 21. For example, a 2011 Canadian study reported that “the blood of 93% of preg-
nant women and 80% of their umbilical-cord blood samples contained a pesticide implanted 
in GMO corn by Monsanto, though digestion was supposed to remove it from the body.” Id. 
The researchers concluded, “given the potential toxicity of these environmental pollutants 
and the fragility of the fetus, more studies are needed.” Aris Aziz & Samuel Leblanc, Mater-
nal and Fetal Exposure to Pesticides Associated to Genetically Modified Foods in Eastern 
Townships of Quebec, Canada, 41 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 528, 532 (2011). 
 22. Eng, supra note 11. 
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ready achieved by Congress through the FSMA in furthering the safety 
of the U.S food supply. 
II. EVIDENCE OF AGENCY INACTION: USURPED BY INDUSTRY 
PARTNERSHIPS? 
The regulatory scheme for GMOs originated in the Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, promulgated in 1986 before 
genetically engineered crops and food products were even developed.
23
 
By focusing simply on the physical attributes of the end products (i.e., 
whether they are “substantially equivalent” to non-GM products), the 
U.S. scheme fails to consider the biotechnology process itself or recog-
nize that it may pose any inherent risks.
24
 Regulatory authority is divid-
ed among three governmental agencies: the FDA, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and the USDA (largely through APHIS), each 
with its narrow focus of inquiries and responsibilities.
25
 As one commen-
tator has observed, “The existing framework of power sharing between 
the USDA, EPA, and FDA yields an incomplete regulatory scheme. 
There is no strong central organization that is entrusted with oversee-
ing GM crops from the issuance of permits through regulating what 
products ultimately reach store shelves.”26 As a consequence, with re-
gard to GMOs, the U.S. system is “poorly regulated” and “largely de-
pendent upon self-reporting.”27 In the absence of active agency over-
sight, this reliance on private industry has proved to be misplaced. 
The Secretary of the USDA, Tom Vilsack, has repeatedly reached 
out to the biotech industry as well as nonconventional farmers, seeking 
a compromise position.
28
 His position appears to reflect a lack of under-
                                                     
 23. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 
(Jun. 26, 1986). 
 24. See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 174–76. 
 25. See TADLOCK COWAN & GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
32809, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: BACKGROUND AND RECENT ISSUES 7 (2010), http://in 
fousa.state.gov/economy/industry/docs/73949.pdf. 
 26. Blake Denton, Comment, Regulating the Regulators: The Increased Role for the 
Federal Judiciary in Monitoring the Debate over Genetically Modified Crops, 25 U.C.L.A. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 333, 355 (2007) (highlighting the role of the courts in these lawsuits to 
allow private litigants to help shape public policy in the field, to provide a public forum to 
voice grievances about biotechnology, and to exert pressure on Congress to fix the current 
fragmented regulatory framework); see also Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organ-
izing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 65 (2000) (citing National 
Academy of Sciences committee recommendation that Congress should establish a unified 
and central framework for managing federal food safety programs headed by a single organi-
zation).  
 27. Denton, supra note 26, at 355. 
 28. See, e.g., Charles Abbott, USDA’s Vilsack Seeks Compromise on Biotech Crops, 
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/11/us-usa-agriculture-
idUSTRE7083CA20110111 (Vilsack told the largest farm group that “farmers could see less 
government interference if they find a way for traditional and genetically modified crops to 
co-exist”). See also Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 169–76 (citing potential 
dangers of GMOs to human health and the environment, including a precautionary report by 
the National Research Council). But see A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Bio-
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standing that coexistence may not be possible given the potential dan-
gers of GMOs. His failure to acknowledge that GMOs could pose some 
risks is perhaps a function of his own biotech, farm state background.
29
 
Under his tenure, the USDA has continued to approve biotech products, 
including the world’s first genetically engineered corn (known as Event 
3272) designed specifically for biofuel production by Syngenta.
30
 The 
Center for Food Safety (CFS) fears that this biofuel corn “will contami-
nate food-grade corn” and contends that it was approved without a com-
prehensive assessment of its “potential adverse effects on human health, 
the environment, or farmers’ livelihoods.”31 Citing past incidents like the 
StarLink corn contamination caused by the same company,
32
 the CFS 
charged the USDA with “once again put[ing] the special interests of the 
biotechnology and biofuels industries above the clear risks to our na-
tion’s food system.”33 
In a similar incident in 2006, the USDA deregulated LibertyLink 
rice after it contaminated the rice crop and wreaked havoc on the inter-
national export market.
34
 The resulting severe economic loss for rice 
farmers across the country resulted in a series of lawsuits against the 
manufacturer, Bayer CropScience, with multimillion dollar jury verdicts 
last summer and a recent settlement with 11,000 farmers for $750 mil-
                                                                                                                           
tech World: Exploring Statutory Grower Protections, 13 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 206 
(2006) (discussing statutory efforts by some states to implement coexistence strategies). 
 29. Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack’s stand on GM crops and the biotech indus-
try is not surprising. When he was appointed to the position by President Obama at the end 
of 2008 (confirmed by the Senate in January 2009), the Organic Consumers Association 
(OCA) opposed his nomination. See Six Reasons Why Obama Appointing Monsanto’s Buddy, 
Former Iowa Governor Vilsack, for USDA Head Would be a Terrible Idea, ORGANIC 
CONSUMERS ASS’N (Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_15573.cf 
m. The OCA reported repeated events in which Vilsack demonstrated a preference for large 
industrial farms and GM crops. For example, as Iowa state governor in 2005, through a seed 
pre-emption bill, he blocked local communities from regulating where genetically engineered 
crops would be grown. See id. In addition, Vilsack was the founder and former chair of the 
Governor’s Biotechnology Partnership, had often traveled in Monsanto’s company jet, and 
was named Governor of the Year by the Biotechnology Industry Organization, an industry 
lobbying group. Mike Glover, Vilsack, Gross Weigh in on Biotech Decision, GENET-NEWS 
(Oct. 24, 2002), http://www.gene.ch/genet/2002/Oct/msg00057.html; Press Release, Biotech-
nology Indus. Org., Iowa’s Vilsack Named BIO Governor of the Year, Sept. 20, 2001, 
http://www.bio.org/node/1084. 
 30. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, World’s First Genetically Engineered Biofu-
els Corn Threatens Contamination of Food-Grade Corn (Feb. 11, 2011), http://truefoodnow.or 
g/2011/02/11/world%E2%80%99s-first-genetically-engineered-biofuels-corn-threatens-contam 
ination-of-food-grade-corn/. 
 31. Id.  
 32. See Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 160–62 (discussing the 
StarLink corn contamination incident and its aftermath in terms of economic loss and liabil-
ity). 
 33. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, supra note 30 (statement of Andrew Kim-
brell, Executive Director for CFS). 
 34. News Release, USDA Animal Health & Plant Inspection Service, USDA Dereg-
ulates Line of Genetically Engineered Rice (Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsr 
oom/content/2006/11/rice_deregulate.shtml. 
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lion.
35
 Most astonishing, in that case the USDA approved the genetically 
engineered rice after it had caused all of that damage and without con-
ducting or requiring safety tests, solely on the basis of its similarity to 
previously approved rice varieties.
36
 In its press release, the USDA not-
ed that “[d]eregulated items and their progeny are considered safe for 
the environment and can be grown without APHIS oversight.”37 
The agency responsible for plant regulation inspires little confi-
dence with its track record of environmental and food contamination 
from escaped GMOs.
38
 In an internal audit of APHIS in 2005, the 
USDA’s inspector general disclosed that the agency charged with regu-
lating field trials had no knowledge of the location of some field trials, 
did no independent testing of nearby crops, and failed to require biotech 
firms to submit protocols.
39
 Citing multiple inadequacies, the report 
made the following observation: 
In fact, at various stages of the field test process—from approval 
of applications to inspection of fields—weaknesses in APHIS 
regulations and internal management controls increase the risk 
that regulated genetically engineered organisms (GEO) will in-
advertently persist in the environment before they are deemed 
safe to grow without regulation.
40
 
The audit concluded that “APHIS’ current regulations, policies, and pro-
cedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of agricul-
tural biotechnology.”41 Moreover, a 2004 report by the National Re-
search Council urged the government to improve its management and 
supervision, but acknowledged that “there is no way to guarantee that 
field trialed crops will not pollute the environment.”42 Allowing the in-
dustry to monitor itself is essentially a tort waiting to happen.
43
 
                                                     
 35. See Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 156–60 (extensively ana-
lyzing the massive LibertyLink rice litigation and predicting its ultimate settlement); An-
drew Harris & David Beasley, Bayer Agrees to Pay $750 Million to End Lawsuits Over Gene-
Modified Rice, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-01/bayer 
-to-pay-750-million-to-end-lawsuits-over-genetically-modified-rice.html. 
 36. See Press Release, Rachel Iadicicco & Jerry Redding, USDA Animal Health & 
Plant Inspection Service, USDA Deregulated Line of Genetically Engineered Rice, (Nov. 24, 
2006), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2006/11/rice_deregulate.shtml; Jessica 
Fraser, USDA Approves Genetically Engineered Rice that Contaminated U.S. Food Supply; 
Safety Tests Skipped, NATURALNEWS.COM (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.naturalnews.com/021 
203.html.  
 37. Press Release, Iadicicco & Redding, supra note 36. 
 38. See Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 167 (analyzing the legal li-
ability risks of GMOs and concluding that the interests of seed companies, farmers, and con-
sumers will converge in this area to mandate greater certainty and safety).  
 39. USDA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: SW. REGION, AUDIT 50601-8-TE, 
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISM RELEASE PERMITS (2005), http://www.usda.gov/oig/we 
bdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf. 
 40. Id. at i. 
 41. Id. at iv. 
 42. Jeffrey M. Smith, Monsanto Whistleblower Says Genetically Engineered Crops 
May Cause Disease, SPILLING THE BEANS, Aug. 2006, available at http://www.seedsofdecepti 
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Meanwhile, criticisms of current USDA inspection practices and 
calls for an improved system seek to strengthen the agency’s oversight 
of food safety.
44
 For example, Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) is 
urging the White House Office of Management and Budget to act on a 
proposal, submitted in January 2011 after four years of study, to allow 
the USDA to regulate additional strains of E. coli beyond the standard 
O157:H7.
45
 Many food safety advocates claim the government has been 
stalling on expanding required beef testing to these deadly strains even 
as E. coli outbreaks spread throughout Europe.
46
 Additional inspections 
in some areas have been ordered by the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspec-
tion Service (FSIS).
47
 Moreover, concern about the delay in addressing 
                                                                                                                           
on.com/Public/Newsletter/Aug2006MonsantoWhistleblowerSaysG/index.cfm [hereinafter 
Smith, Whistleblower] (quoting Justin Gillis, Genetically Modified Organisms Not Easily 
Contained: National Research Council Panel Urges More Work to Protect Against Contami-
nation of Food Supply, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2004, 6:52 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A32185-2004Jan20&notFound=true) 
(telling the story of a former Monsanto employee who reported that, in GM cotton, unknown 
proteins had been created during the gene insertion process—one of the many possible dan-
gers that are not being evaluated by the biotech industry’s superficial safety assessments). 
 43. Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 167. See, e.g., Field Testing of 
Plants Engineered to Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 
11337-01 (proposed Mar. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340); Environmental Impact 
Statement; Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 69 Fed. Reg. 3271-01 (pro-
posed Jan. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).  
 44. See, e.g., Eileen Starbranch Pape, A Flawed Inspection System: Improvements 
to Current USDA Inspection Practices Needed to Ensure Safer Beef Products, 48 HOUS. L. 
REV. 421, 438–46 (2011) (discussing flaws and proposing changes to the regulatory scheme 
and inspection practices to reduce the number of foodborne illnesses and deaths caused by E. 
coli in meat).  
 45. Helena Bottemiller, DeLauro Presses OMB on Non-O157 E. coli, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (June 23, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/06/rep-delauro-presses-omb-on-
non-o157-e-coli/. Eventually, under pressure from food safety advocates, the ban on E. coli in 
ground beef was extended to six more strains. See William Newman, Ban on E. Coli in 
Ground Beef is to Extend to 6 More Strains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at B1, http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/09/13/business/federal-officials-extend-e-coli-ban.html. 
 46. Michele Simon, A Decade of Inaction at USDA on Non-O157 E. Coli, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (June 29, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/06/usda-a-decade-of-
inaction-on-non-o157-e-coli/; Deirdre Shesgreen, Food Safety Advocates Say Administration 
is Stalling on E. Coli Rules, THE CONN. MIRROR (June 27, 2011), http://www.ctmirror.org/stor 
y/13058/ecoli. The proposed rules purportedly address the “six dangerous strains of E. coli” in 
ground beef and are expected to require testing or even make it illegal to sell ground beef 
contaminated with these strains. William Neuman, Outbreak in Europe May Revive Stalled 
U.S. Effort to Tighten Rules on Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.co 
m/2011/06/04/business/04prevent.html?_r=2.  
 47. See, e.g., Dan Flynn, More Ground Beef Testing Ordered by FSIS, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/07/more-ground-beef-testing-ord 
ered-by-fsis/ (increase in sampling and testing slated for E. coli O157:H7 at mid- to large-
sized ground beef processing plants for August and September 2011); News Desk, FSIS Is-
sues Notice on Program to Curb Salmonella, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 11, 2011), http://www. 
foodsafetynews.com/2011/07/fsis-issues-notice-on-salmonella-initiative-program/ (FSIS post-
ed notice on proposed policy changes to its voluntary, incentive-based Salmonella Initiative 
Program, SIP). See also News Release, USDA, USDA Takes New Steps to Fight E. Coli, Pro-
tect the Food Supply (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?conte 
ntidonly=true&contentid=2011/09/0400.xml. 
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this gap in food safety is so heightened that, after earlier opposition 
from the industry, two U.S. companies have stepped in with their own 
plans to protect consumers. Costco Wholesale and Beef Products Inc. 
have begun testing programs for a broad range of toxic E. coli as a re-
quirement for their suppliers of bagged produce and their own ground 
beef.
48
 
The most important voices, those of consumers who the agencies 
are obligated to protect, add another dimension to the problem. A recent 
consumer survey reported that more than half of the shoppers who were 
asked where they believed that the food safety breaches occur pointed to 
food processing and manufacturing plants.
49
 Responding to a question 
about who is responsible for ensuring food safety, more than half (58%) 
identified themselves, 35% named manufacturers and processors, fol-
lowed by supermarkets and government agencies at 28% each.
50
 It 
seems Americans recognize that ensuring food safety is not primarily 
the responsibility of government agencies. Equally significant, in spite 
of rising prices and budgetary pressures of a recession, interest in pur-
chasing organic foods remains strong and is even on the rise.
51
 The turn 
to organic foods may reflect another consumer message that they seek 
added food security and are willing to pay for it for as long as they can 
manage to do so.
52
 However, these trends do not obviate the statutory 
responsibility of government agencies to protect the mainstream food 
supply for the average consumer in the United States. 
III. COURT CASES AGAINST AGENCY INACTION: THE OUTER 
BOUNDS OF DEFERENCE 
In the area of GMOs, the courts are now taking the role that was 
originally intended for the regulatory agencies, reasoning that those 
agencies have not been following their statutory mandates. The U.S. 
Supreme Court recently concluded that the lower courts had gone too 
far in blocking a deregulation by APHIS and ordering that the planting 
of GM alfalfa could not proceed. As the first Supreme Court case on GM 
foods, this case merits detailed analysis as to its future impact in this 
                                                     
 48. William Neuman, Food Companies Act to Protect Consumers from E. Coli Ill-
ness, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/food-companie 
s-act-to-protect-consumers-from-e-coli-illness.html (“Representative Rosa L. DeLauro, a 
Connecticut Democrat, on Friday sent a letter to Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, decry-
ing the delay and urging him to unilaterally declare any ground beef containing the six addi-
tional strains of toxic E. coli unfit for sale. Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, a New York Demo-
crat, wrote last week to the Office of Management and Budget, asking it to act on the 
U.S.D.A. rules.”). 
 49. News Release, Food Marketing Institute, FMI Grocery Shopper Trends 2011: 
Consumers More Confident in Safety of Food Supply (May 10, 2011), http://www.fmi.org/new 
s_releases/index.cfm?fuseaction=mediatext&id=1236. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Among those who have decided not to continue purchasing organic, 85% stated 
cost is the main reason; another important reason cited by 38% is their preference to buy 
locally grown foods instead. Id. 
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area. Consumer and environmental organizations have instituted other 
litigation against government agencies, particularly under environmen-
tal statutes. An exploration of these key cases—involving GM alfalfa, 
GM sugar beets, GM creeping bentgrass, biopharming, GM eucalyptus, 
and others—demonstrates the limits of judicial review over agency inac-
tion and the concurrent need to explore other solutions in order to im-
prove the regulatory scheme for GM crops. 
A. The Supreme Court and GM Alfalfa 
Most significant in this area is the recent GM alfalfa case, Monsan-
to Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.
53
 As the U.S. Supreme Court’s “first-ever 
ruling on genetically modified crops,” this decision has been viewed as “a 
victory for Monsanto and others in the agricultural biotechnology indus-
try, with potential implications for other cases.”54 Yet this impact may 
be overstated, at least with regards to the merits, because the ruling 
was—by its terms—narrow and limited.55 “The Supreme Court did not 
go so far as to approve the GM alfalfa or address safety concerns; at 
most, it shifted some regulatory responsibility away from the courts and 
back on the regulatory agencies charged in the first instance with these 
oversight responsibilities.”56 As such, the case warrants a closer exami-
nation to determine precisely what the Court did hold and thus its im-
plications both for potential appeals of cases that have been proceeding 
against agency inaction and for future cases that will continue to be 
filed in the effort to block the planting of GM crops. 
Under authority delegated by the USDA, APHIS makes the deter-
mination of whether to grant nonregulated status to a GM plant if it 
does not present a “plant pest” risk and thus is not subject to the regula-
tions promulgated under the Plant Protection Act (PPA).
57
 In doing so, 
“APHIS must comply with NEPA [the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act], which requires federal agencies ‘to the fullest extent possible’ 
to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for ‘every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’”58 
However, “[a]n agency need not complete an EIS for a particular pro-
                                                     
 53. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 54. See Andrew Pollack, Justices Back Monsanto on Biotech Seed Planting, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/business/22bizcourt.html?scp=1& 
sq=Justices%20Back%20Monsanto%20on%20Biotech%20Seed%20Planting&st=cse. 
 55. See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756. The Court claimed that its opinion would ad-
dress only the injunction prohibiting APHIS from deregulating RRA before the EIS was 
completed, and the nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all RRA planting while the EIS 
was pending. Id. 
 56. See Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 165.  
 57. The Plant Protection Act (PPA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–11(c)(2) (2006); 7 C.F.R. § 
340.6 (2012). APHIS may grant such a petition in whole or in part. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d)(3). 
 58. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750 (citing The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). 
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posal if it finds, on the basis of a shorter ‘environmental assessment’ 
(EA), that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the 
environment”59 or if it produces a “convincing statement of reasons why 
potential effects are insignificant.”60 
In an action brought by conventional alfalfa growers and environ-
mental groups against the developer of Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA) 
and APHIS, the district court concluded that APHIS had violated NEPA 
by failing to prepare an EIS before ordering a complete deregulation of 
RRA.
61
 The district court held that an EIS was required because of the 
“potential significant environmental impact of gene transmission; specif-
ically, the acknowledged risk that the genetically engineered gene will 
‘contaminate’ organic and conventional alfalfa.”62 In addition, the dis-
trict court found that the federal “defendants had failed to adequately 
consider the deregulation decision’s impact on the development of 
Roundup-resistant weeds.”63 It then entered an injunction preventing 
the future planting of the engineered alfalfa until APHIS prepared an 
EIS.
64
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court’s decision.65 However, in a 7 to 1 decision on June 21, 2010, 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, stating that the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion in granting an injunction prohibit-
ing partial deregulation of RRA.
66
 The Supreme Court held that APHIS 
must still complete the EIS, but can decide to partially deregulate the 
alfalfa, thus allowing it to be planted before the EIS is finished.
67
 
At the outset, it is significant to note that the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the conventional alfalfa growers and environmental groups 
did have constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from complete 
deregulation because they had established a reasonable probability that 
their conventional alfalfa crops would be infected with the engineered 
gene, and that this substantial risk of gene flow harm was sufficiently 
concrete to constitute injury-in-fact.
68
 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
implicitly acknowledged that under NEPA the government must avoid 
                                                     
 59. Id. 
 60. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Haw. 2006) (cit-
ing Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 61. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C06-01075CRB, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21491 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2007) (order granting preliminary injunction ). RRA is alfalfa genetically 
engineered to resist the herbicide Roundup. Roundup Ready Alfalfa, USDA ANIMAL & PLANT 
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/alfalfa.shtml (last visit-
ed March 23, 2012)  
 62. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21491, at *3. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C06-01075CRB, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32701 
(N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007). 
 65. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1133 (2010).  
 66. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 67. Id. at 2761. 
 68. Id. at 2755. 
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“contamination” in their regulation of GM crops.69 Moreover, since the 
petitioners and the Government had not argued otherwise, the Supreme 
Court assumed without deciding that the district court acted lawfully in 
vacating the agency’s decision to completely deregulate RRA.70 As a re-
sult, the Court expressly limited its review to consideration of the in-
junction prohibiting APHIS from deregulating RRA pending completion 
of the EIS and the nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all RRA 
planting during this time.
71
 Nor did the Court provide any view on the 
Government’s contention that a limited deregulation would not require 
the preparation in advance of an EIS.
72
 The Court merely observed that, 
when the preparation of an EIS is required, the NEPA regulations do 
permit the agency to take at least some action during the pendency of 
the EIS process. “Until APHIS actually seeks to effect a partial deregu-
lation, any judicial review” of that approach’s potential harm to an ag-
grieved party would be “premature.”73 If and when a partial deregula-
tion should occur, plaintiffs could file another lawsuit challenging such 
action under NEPA and seeking appropriate preliminary relief.
74
 
Instead, the essence of the Supreme Court’s decision for which this 
case will be cited in the future is its reiteration of the standard for 
granting a permanent injunction.
75
 Faced with the possibility that the 
district court had presumed that an injunction is the proper remedy for 
a NEPA violation except in unusual circumstances, the Supreme Court 
asserted that “[n]o such thumb on the scales is warranted.”76 The Court 
                                                     
 69. See Thomas P. Redick, Biotech Crops Encountering New “Economic Loss” Lia-
bility, ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Envt., 
Energy, & Res., Envtl. Impact Assessment Comm., Chi., Ill.), Nov. 2010, at 7 (interpreting 
this ruling as the Supreme Court sending a message about economic loss that could impact 
common law nuisance and trespass cases in this area). 
 70. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2758. 
 74. Id. at 2760; see also James A. Douglas & Patrick J. Hamill, Injunction Pending 
Compliance, in FED. ENVIR. REG. OF REAL EST. L. DIG. § 1:7 (2011). 
 75. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2010); Lands 
Council v. Cottrell, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1056 (D. Idaho 2010) (“Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms, . . . there was a line of Ninth Circuit 
decisions suggesting that an injunction is the proper remedy for a NEPA violation absent 
unusual circumstances.”). But see Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 
2002) (reasoning, before Monsanto, that an evidentiary hearing was not required before issu-
ing a permanent injunction because it was a temporary measure until the Bureau of Land 
Management performed an environmental assessment); Daniel Mach, Rules Without Rea-
sons: The Diminishing Role of Statutory Policy and Equitable Discretion in the Law of NEPA 
Remedies, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 205 (2011) (analyzing the Monsanto case and criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s “development of rigid rules of equity for NEPA injunction decisions,” pro-
posing that “an effective law of NEPA remedies will require a workable balance of statutory 
interpretation, administrative law policy, and deference to trial courts’ equitable discre-
tion.”). 
 76. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2757. 
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emphasized that an injunction should issue only if the traditional four-
factor test is satisfied.
77
 Accordingly, the plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in eq-
uity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.
78
 
It was not clear whether the district court had applied this strin-
gent standard in issuing a permanent injunction, and the Court ex-
pressed doubts that the conventional alfalfa growers and environmental 
groups could show that “they [would] suffer irreparable injury if APHIS 
[were] allowed to proceed with any partial deregulation.”79 Thus, the 
Supreme Court concluded, “[i]f a less drastic remedy (such as partial or 
complete vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision) was sufficient to 
redress [their] injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary 
relief of an injunction was warranted.”80 Although the Supreme Court 
took care to limit the reach of courts in fashioning a remedy properly left 
to the agencies, its decision reflects a judicial readiness to require 
APHIS to prepare a formal EIS before complete deregulation of GM 
seeds.
81
 
The GM alfalfa saga continues with the most recent developments 
arising in part as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision lifting 
the ban but not obviating the need for an environmental review by the 
agency. In mid-December 2010, APHIS completed an EIS that concluded 
GM alfalfa would not harm organic or conventional crops.
82
 APHIS of-
fered two options—allowing the engineered alfalfa with no restrictions 
or with certain geographic and isolation restriction to protect non-
engineered crops—and, after hearing objections by biotechnology com-
panies and some members of Congress, chose complete deregulation.
83
 
                                                     
 77. Id. (citing Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008)). 
 78. Id. at 2756 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006)). 
 79. Id. at 2759. 
 80. Id. at 2761. 
 81. See Aoki, supra note 9, at 468–69; Thomas P. Redick, Biotech Liability’s Water-
shed Year, TRENDS (Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Envt., Energy, & Res., Chi., Ill.), Sept.–Oct. 
2010, at 1, 14 (interpreting Monsanto to say that “the district court should have remanded 
the matter ‘to the [USDA] so that it could determine whether to pursue a partial deregula-
tion during the pendency of the EIS process.’” (quoting Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754)).  
 82. ANDREA HUBERTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT 
ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED STATUS – FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2010), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downl 
oads/alfalfa/gt_alfalfa%20_feis.pdf. 
 83. Id.; see News Release, USDA, USDA Announces Final Environmental Impact 
Statement for Genetically Engineered Alfalfa (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.usda.gov/wps/port 
al/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2010/12/0667.xml. Note that the agency 
did not set forth as a third option maintaining the GM alfalfa’s regulated status. See also 
Helena Bottemiller, USDA Fully Deregulates Roundup Ready Alfalfa, FOOD SAFETY NEWS 
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Agriculture Secretary Vilsack had favored partial deregulation, predict-
ing that complete deregulation would end up back in court: 
The rapid adoption of GE [genetically engineered] crops has 
clashed with the rapid expansion of the demand for organic and 
other non-GE products. This clash led to litigation and uncer-
tainty. Such litigation will potentially lead to the courts’ decid-
ing who gets to farm their way and who will be prevented from 
doing so.
84
 
Vilsack attempted to strike a placatory note towards coexistence 
between biotechnology and the non-genetically engineered sectors in 
agriculture, stating that the USDA is willing to work with all the stake-
holders in the debate.
85
 However, in what was considered “an unex-
pected move,” Secretary Vilsack later announced that rather than im-
plement partial deregulation, the USDA would allow Roundup Ready 
alfalfa to be planted without restriction, purportedly under pressure 
from the Obama administration, which sought to appear friendly to big 
business.
86
 
In response, CFS and Earthjustice filed a new lawsuit against 
APHIS for unlawfully permitting GM alfalfa to be grown without re-
striction.
87
 The plaintiffs included a diverse coalition of conventional and 
organic farmers, dairies and agricultural associations, and environmen-
tal and consumer groups: CFS, Beyond Pesticides, Cornucopia Institute, 
California Farmers Union, Dakota Resources Council, Geertson Seed 
Farms, National Family Farm Coalition, Northeast Organic Dairy Pro-
ducers Alliance, Sierra Club, Trask Family Seeds, and the Western Or-
ganization of Resource Councils.
88
 The executive director of CFS com-
plained that the “USDA has once again failed to provide adequate over-
sight of a biotech crop,”89 further asserting that: 
                                                                                                                           
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/01/usda-fully-deregulates-ge-roundup-
ready-alfalfa/. 
 84. Mary Rothschild, New Lawsuit Challenges USDA Approval of GE Alfalfa, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/03/new-lawsuit-challeng 
es-usda-approval-of-ge-alfalfa/; see also Helena Bottemiller, Vilsack Calls for a Truce in GE 
Crops Fight, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/12/vil 
savk-calls-for-coexistance-cooperation-in-ge-debate/. 
 85. Rothschild, supra note 84; see also Bottemiller, supra note 84. In an open letter 
to stakeholders, USDA Secretary Vilsack called for “a new paradigm of coexistence and coop-
eration” among GM and non-GM sectors. Letter from Thomas J. Vilsack, Secretary, USDA, 
to Stakeholders (December 2010), http://www.usda.gov/documents/GE_Alfalfa-to_stakeholde 
rs-2010Dec.pdf. However, actions speak louder than words, as the subsequent one-sided 
approval may make such coexistence impossible. 
 86. Bottemiller, supra note 83. 
 87. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. CV11-1310 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2011). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Farmers and Consumer Groups File Law-
suit Challenging Genetically Engineered Alfalfa Approval (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.center 
forfoodsafety.org/2011/03/18/farmers-and-consumer-groups-file-lawsuit-challenging-genetical 
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USDA has become a rogue agency in its regulation of biotech 
crops and its decision to appease the few companies who seek to 
benefit from this technology comes despite increasing evidence 
that GE alfalfa will threaten the rights of farmers and consum-
ers, as well as damage the environment.
90
 
One plaintiff, farmer Phil Geertson, argued that the “USDA’s re-
view is inaccurate and completely failed to consider critical issues. The 
decision to deregulate Roundup Ready alfalfa opens the door to wide-
spread transgenic contamination, costing farmers their markets, repu-
tation and ability to grow natural varieties.”91 The Northeast Alliance of 
Organic Dairy Products added, 
Approving the unrestricted planting of GE alfalfa is a blatant 
case of the USDA serving one form of agriculture at the expense 
of all others. If this decision is not remedied, the result will be 
lost livelihoods for organic dairy farmers, loss of choice for farm-
ers and consumers, and no transparency about GE contamina-
tion of our foods.
92
 
Genetic contamination of organic alfalfa, which also serves as a 
source of organic feed, could cause economic loss for the $20 billion-
dollar organic milk industry.
93
 In addition to causing contamination of 
conventional and organic farms through pollen-drift and cross-
pollination by bees, it is estimated that with the full deregulation of GM 
alfalfa, up to 23 million more pounds of toxic herbicides will be released 
into the environment each year.
94
 In the last ten years, the proliferation 
of other Roundup Ready crops, such as soy, cotton, and corn, have re-
sulted in a 382 million pound overall increase in herbicide usage.
95
 The 
increased use of the herbicide will lead to the development of more 
glyphosate-resistant weeds. Such “superweeds” have increased four-fold 
to infest over 10 million acres since 2008, and it is projected that 38 mil-
lion acres will be infested by 2013.
96
 Alfalfa is the fourth most prevalent 
crop in the United States, which covers more than 20 million acres and 
                                                                                                                           
ly-engineered-alfalfa-approval/ (“USDA failures guarantee transgenic contamination, crea-
tion of more superweeds.”). 
 90. Bottemiller, supra note 83 (statement of Andrew Kimbrell, Executive Director 
of CFS). 
 91. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, supra note 89. 
 92. Rothschild, supra note 84 (statement of executive director Ed Maltby); see also 
GM Alfalfa Decision Prompts New Lawsuit, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/GM-alfalfa-decision-prompts-new-lawsuit. 
 93. Rothschild, supra note 84. 
 94. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, supra note 89. 
 95. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Farmers and Conservationists Challenge 
Latest Federal Approval of Genetically Engineered Sugar Beets (Feb. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/02/04/farmers-and-conservationists-challenge-latest-
federal-approval-of-genetically-engineered-sugar-beets/. 
 96. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, supra note 89. 
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spans every state.
97
 Thus the potential results of this complete deregula-
tion could be both negative and far-reaching. 
B. The Epic Case of GM Sugar Beets 
In another epic, ongoing action initiated in 2008, plaintiff farmers, 
the Sierra Club, and other consumer organizations challenged the 
USDA’s decision to deregulate Monsanto’s glyphosate-resistant sugar 
beets despite considerable questions about potential environmental deg-
radation and alleged violations of NEPA.
98
 In the spring of 2008 as the 
planting of Roundup Ready sugar beets was beginning in the western 
United States, the agriculture manager for Amalgamated Sugar an-
nounced that 95% of Idaho’s sugar beet production would be Roundup 
Ready.
99
 With the previous year’s production of 167,000 acres of sugar 
beets, Idaho farmers would plant 150,000 acres of GM sugar beets that 
year.
100
 In total, farmers grow approximately 1.3 million acres of sugar 
beets in 12 states, largely in western Minnesota, eastern North Dakota, 
the Pacific Northwest, Great Plains, and Great Lakes regions.
101
 
Since Roundup Ready sugar beets are wind pollinated and the 
crops are grown in close proximity, there is a strong possibility that pol-
len from GM sugar beets could contaminate non-GM sugar beets and 
other major related crops such as chard and red and yellow beets (“table 
beets”).102 As a result, the economic impact for conventional and organic 
farmers could be catastrophic. In addition, the fact that the planting of 
GM sugar beets can exacerbate the problem of herbicide-resistant weeds 
has already been well documented.
103
 Despite initial promises to the 
contrary, scientific studies show that the use of Roundup herbicide has 
increased with the planting of Roundup Ready crops which, in turn, has 
led to the rapid spread of “superweeds” (e.g., marestail, common and 
giant ragweed, waterhemp, Palmer pigweed, cocklebur, lambsquarters, 
morning glory, and velvetleaf) that did not exhibit this resistance prior 
                                                     
 97. Id. 
 98. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack (Sugar Beets I), No. 08-00484 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 
2009) (order regarding cross-motions for summary judgment); Alex McNally, Lawsuit Filed 
Over Monsantos GM Sugar Beet, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.food 
navigator-usa.com/Regulation/Lawsuit-filed-over-Monsantos-GM-sugar-beet; see also 
Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 164 (discussing sugar beet and other GM 
cases). 
 99. Battle Lines Drawn Over GM Sugar Beets, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 6, 
2008), http://www.enn.com/agriculture/article/32414 (statement of John Schorr, agriculture 
manager for Amalgamated Sugar). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. The National Research Council has also issued its own warning about the 
emergence of resistant weeds and other risks as limiting the potential benefits of GM crops. 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM 
SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/g 
enengcrops.pdf. 
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to the introduction of Roundup Ready and are now increasingly threat-
ening farmers’ crops.104 
Trade organizations and environmental groups have questioned 
whether the government has fulfilled its oversight responsibilities. As 
the President of High Mowing Organic Seeds commented, “the issue of 
releasing GMO crops without serious research or oversight risks the 
security of our food supply and the economic viability of our nation’s 
non-GMO and organic farmers.”105 Earthjustice added, 
  The law requires the government to take a hard look at the 
impact that deregulating Roundup Ready sugar beets will have 
on human health, agriculture and the environment. The gov-
ernment cannot simply ignore the fact that deregulation will 
harm organic farmers and consumers, and exacerbate the grow-
ing epidemic of herbicide-resistant weeds.
106
 
In the GM sugar beet case, District Judge Jeffrey S. White ruled in 
September 2009 that the USDA failed to adequately assess the envi-
ronmental impact of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready sugar beets before in-
troducing them into the food supply,
107
 but in a later decision denied 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.108 On August 13, 2010, 
the judge declined to grant a permanent injunction as unnecessary due 
to his vacatur of the USDA approval.
109
 Explaining that the vacatur ap-
plied to all future plantings but not previous ones, he ordered the crop 
harvested and processed or stored, but did not require it to be de-
stroyed.
110
 In his decision, Judge White cited the Monsanto GM alfalfa 
                                                     
104. Battle Lines Drawn Over GM Sugar Beets, supra note 99. According to an inde-
pendent analysis of USDA data by Dr. Charles Benbrook, former Board of Agriculture Chair 
of the National Academy of Sciences, GM crops increased U.S. herbicide use by 15 times—
122 million pounds—between 1994, when planting of herbicide resistant crops began, and 
2004. Id. As a consequence, Roundup-resistant weeds have been reported on 2.4 million acres 
of cropland in the United States. Id.; see also Strauss, Ethical Implications, supra note 13, at 
7–19 (debunking the myths that this technology would reduce world hunger, decrease pesti-
cide usage, improve nutritional content, and increase farmers’ income and contrasting these 
claims of potential benefits with the risks).  
105. Battle Lines Drawn Over GM Sugar Beets, supra note 99 (statement of Tom 
Stearns, President of High Mowing Organic Seeds). 
106. Id. (statement of Greg Loarie of Earthjustice). 
107. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at 13-
14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009) (APHIS required to prepare EIS for GM sugar beets); see also 
Caroline Scott-Thomas, Judge Rules Against Monsanto’s GM Sugar Beets, FOODNAVIGATOR-
USA.COM (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/Judge-rules-agains 
t-Monsanto-s-GM-sugar-beets [hereinafter Scott-Thomas, Judge Rules Against Sugar Beets]; 
Battle Lines Drawn Over GM Sugar Beets, supra note 99. 
108. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Schafer, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2010 WL 964017, at *4–5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010) (expressing serious reservations in weighing the equities of the 
parties and denying the injunction).“In light of Plaintiffs’ showing of irreparable harm to the 
environment, the Court is troubled by maintaining the status quo that consists of ninety-five 
percent of sugar beets being genetically engineered while APHIS conducts the environmental 
review that should have occurred before the sugar beets were deregulated.” Id. 
109. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
110. Id. 
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case and considered his ruling to be in keeping with the Supreme 
Court’s admonition against overly broad remedies and premature re-
view of potential agency action.
111
 Although he concluded that “the ‘addi-
tional and extraordinary relief of an injunction’ was not warranted if a 
less drastic remedy, such as vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision, 
was sufficient to redress the plaintiff’s injury,” Judge White made it 
clear that further redress would be available to plaintiffs in the future if 
defendants or other third parties actually violated the vacatur.
112
 Most 
importantly, the court expressed concern that the government defend-
ants were “not taking this process seriously,” but instead viewed the 
“requisite comprehensive review [as] a mere formality.”113 Denying de-
fendants’ request to delay its vacatur and provide APHIS with time to 
implement interim measures, the court noted there had been ample 
time since its previous ruling and banned the deregulation of the crop 
until USDA fully analyzed the impacts of the GE plant on the environ-
ment, farmers and the public with an EIS.
114
 
Three weeks later, despite the court’s ruling and with only a less-
than-comprehensive EA, the USDA issued permits to seed growers to 
plant the genetically modified sugar beets.
115
 The groups again sued the 
USDA (the court labeled the case “Sugar Beets II”).116 On November 30, 
2010, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion and ordered the seed crop destroyed.
117
 That order was stayed pend-
ing appeal.
118
 
On February 25, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit overturned the preliminary injunction in Sugar Beets II, citing the 
                                                     
111. Id. at 954. 
112. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 
(2010)). 
113. Id. at 953. 
114. Id.  
115. See Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Farmers and Consumer Groups File 
Lawsuit Challenging Genetically Engineered Alfalfa Approval, supra note 89. But see Sugar 
Indus. Biotech Council, Statement by the Sugar Industry Biotech Council on USDA’s APHIS 
Announcement for Partial Deregulation of Roundup Ready Sugar Beets (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.sugarindustrybiotechcouncil.org/sugar-beet-news/statement-by-the-sugar-industr 
y-biotech-council-on-usdas-aphis-announcement-for-partial-deregulation-of-roundup-ready-
sugar-beets (stating that the sugar beet industry “appreciates the Secretary’s leadership” 
and that there has been no evidence of harm, as the commercial crop grown for sugar pro-
duction does not produce seed). 
116. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack (Sugar Beets II), No. 10-4038 JSW (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 30, 2010) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
117. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
118. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2011). See Press 
Release, Farmers and Conservationists Challenge Federal Approval of GE Sugar Beets, su-
pra note 95; Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Organic Industry Supports CFS in GE Sug-
ar Beets Appeal (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/01/31/o 
rganic-industry-supports-cfs-in-ge-sugar-beets-appeal/ (leading organic businesses and trade 
groups file joint brief to Court of Appeals in support of CFS and in opposition to Monsanto on 
behalf of $25 billion a year organic industry warning of imminent threat to their businesses 
from biotech contamination). 
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Supreme Court’s holding in Monsanto as a warning “against premature 
review of APHIS’s regulatory actions.”119 With a similar analysis, the 
Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the burdens 
of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury and 
showing a “reason not to defer to APHIS’s technical expertise and judg-
ments.”120 In the limited deregulation at issue, which was geographically 
restricted and prohibited flowering or pollination, the court determined 
that the immature sugar beet plants (“stecklings”) posed a negligible 
risk of genetic contamination.
121
 The juvenile plants were biologically 
incapable of flowering or cross-pollinating before February 28, 2011, 
when the permits would expire and the stecklings, under the APHIS 
order, were required to be destroyed.
122
 Thus, the court concluded that 
these plaintiffs were “unlikely to face irreparable substantive harm from 
the stecklings, and if a subsequent APHIS decision aggrieves them, they 
may challenge it and seek appropriate preliminary relief.”123 The Court 
of Appeals was careful to note that it made this ruling “without express-
ing any views on the merits of the ultimate issues in this case or other 
pending related litigation.”124 However, this caveat did not stop the sug-
ar industry from declaring victory in broader terms, saying it was 
pleased that the Ninth Circuit, “after considering relevant legal prece-
dents and evidence, concluded that the planting of these permitted 
stecklings was unlikely to cause harm and that deference should be giv-
en to APHIS’ ‘technical expertise and judgments on this score.’”125 
Again, on February 4, 2011, APHIS issued a new decision to allow 
plantings of GM sugar beets with only a limited EA to support the par-
tial deregulation.
126
 In response, the CFS issued a statement: 
There is clear evidence of harm to the environment from GE 
sugar beets. . . . Because USDA continues to bow to industry 
pressure and permits further commercial production of 
Roundup Ready sugar beets, without first preparing an EIS or 
protecting the public, the Center for Food Safety will once 
again seek to halt the planting in court.
127
 
                                                     
119. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2011). 
120. Id. at 1173. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1174. 
124. Id. 
125. Sugar Indus. Biotech Council, Statement by the Sugar Industry Biotech Council 
on Appellate Court Activity (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.sugarindustrybiotechcouncil.org/suga 
r-beet-news/statement-by-the-sugar-industry-biotech-council-on-appellate-court-activity. 
126. Press Release, USDA, USDA Announces Partial Deregulation for Roundup 
Ready Sugar Beets (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2011/02/rr_sugar_be 
ets.shtml. 
127. Press Release, Farmers and Conservationists Challenge Latest Federal Ap-
proval of Genetically Engineered Sugar Beets, supra note 95 (statement of Paige Tomaselli, 
Staff Attorney for the CFS). 
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Then, on February 7, 2011, in a related action that the original 
plaintiffs called a “race to the courthouse,” a group of sugar beet grow-
ers, processors, seed producers and trade associations, including three 
intervenor-defendants in the Sugar Beets II case, filed a declaratory re-
lief action in the District Court for the District of Columbia, Grant v. 
Vilsack.
128
 The Grant action challenges the conditions APHIS’s February 
4, 2011 decision imposed on Roundup Ready sugar beet root and seed 
crop production activities and, in the alternative, seeks a declaratory 
judgment that the EA and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI: an 
explanation of why the selected action will have no significant effects on 
the human environment) comply with NEPA.
129
 Grant named CFS and 
Sierra Club as non-governmental defendants because their “past actions 
and threats of further [legal] action” allegedly present “a significant 
threat to our nation’s sugar supply in the 2011 crop year.”130 Upon a mo-
tion of the Federal Defendants (APHIS and USDA) in the original action 
(Sugar Beets II), Judge White transferred his case to the District of Co-
lumbia to be heard with the Grant case for efficiency and consistency in 
rulings and, in part, “because the APHIS’s administrative process oc-
curred in the District of Columbia and Federal Defendants reside there, 
the District of Columbia has a stronger local interest than this district 
in adjudicating this action challenging the interim agency decision.”131 
In a subsequent development, the Court of Appeals on May 20, 
2011, issued a summary order dismissing the appeal of Monsanto and 
other biotech industry intervenors and affirming the lower court’s rul-
ings in Sugar Beets I, effectively concluding the long-standing law-
suit.
132
 The attorney for CFS praised the decision: 
Today’s order cements a critical legal benchmark in the battle 
for meaningful oversight of biotech crops and food. Because of 
this case, there will be public disclosure and debate on the 
harmful impacts of these pesticide-promoting crops, as well as 
legal protections for farmers threatened by contamination.
133
 
However, the biotech sugar industry portrayed a different spin, 
stating on its website that the intervenor group had voluntarily asked 
that the appeal be dismissed: 
                                                     
128. Complaint, Grant v. Vilsack, No. 11-308 JDB (D.D.C. filed Feb. 7, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/02/08/RoboSugar.pdf. 
129. Id. at 22. 
130. Id. at 19. 
131. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C11-00831JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31688, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). 
132. This decision concerned case No. 10-17335 (Sugar Beets I). See Press Release, 
Ctr. for Food Safety, Court of Appeals Dismisses Monsanto’s Appeal of Biotech Beets Case, 
Preserves Victory for Farmers, Environment (May 20, 2011), http://www.centerforfoodsafety. 
org/2011/05/20/court-of-appeals-dismisses-monsantos-appeal-of-biotech-beets-case-preserves-
victory-for-farmers-environment/ [hereinafter Dismissal of Monsanto’s Appeal].  
133. Dismissal of Monsanto’s Appeal, supra note 132 (statement of CFS attorney 
George Kimbrell). 
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As a result of subsequent court decisions and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) actions, continuation of the appeals 
had little consequence for Roundup Ready sugar beet growers or 
seed companies. The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspec-
tion Service (APHIS) has issued interim measures to allow the 
planting of Roundup Ready sugar beets and farmers are plant-
ing Roundup Ready sugar beet crops.
134
 
Although the partial deregulation scheme for the 2011–2012 season 
is the subject of a second case proceeding through the courts (Sugar 
Beets II), the dismissal of this appeal has the effect of requiring the 
USDA to prepare a thorough review of the GM sugar beets before it can 
make a decision on whether to allow a reentry into commercial produc-
tion.
135
 The EIS should be completed in 2012, around mid-year.
136
 
Astonishingly, this is only the second EIS “the USDA has under-
taken for any GE crop in over 15 years of approving such crops for hu-
man consumption,” and both assessments “were court ordered.”137 In his 
remarks to the press in connection with this litigation, Agriculture Sec-
retary Tom Vilsack again displayed his pro-industry, biotech bent, criti-
cizing “a circumstance where a single judge can essentially decide 
whether someone gets to farm or doesn’t get to farm.”138 He continues to 
insist that, “We need to figure out ways in which those who wish to do 
biotech and those who wish to do organic can live together in the same 
universe and be able to do what they think is best for their operation.”139 
His conciliatory approach clearly favors a coexistence that may not be 
possible without a more thorough examination of the genuine risks.
140
 
Meanwhile, in spite of the claims that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready crops 
have led to the greater use of herbicides and the spread of herbicide re-
sistant weeds, as well as contamination of conventional and organic 
                                                     
134. Sugar Indus. Biotech Council, Statement by the Sugar Industry Biotech Council 
on Appellate Court Activity (May 26, 2011), http://www.sugarindustrybiotechcouncil.org/suga 
r-beet-news/. 
135. Caroline Scott-Thomas, Sugar Beet Appeal Dismissed: Plaintiffs Hail Dismissal 
of Appeal in GM Sugar Beet Case, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.COM (May 26, 2011), http://www.sa 
ynotogmos.org/ud2011/index.php/2011/05/26/sugar-beet-appeal-dismissed/ [hereinafter Scott-
Thomas, Sugar Beet Appeal Dismissed]. 
136. Id.; see also USDA, supra note 126.  
137. Dismissal of Monsanto’s Appeal, supra note 132. 
138. Andrew Pollack, Duel Over Sugar Beet Seeds Could Create Shortage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at B7. 
139. Id. 
140. If the USDA and APHIS continue to view this dispute as a mere “philosophical” 
difference in values and preferences of organic consumers and producers, as indicated in 
their EIS for GM alfalfa, their failure to recognize the economic and environmental harms 
will require a change at the policy-making level rather than enforcement of existing law 
through litigation in federal courts. See Alex Platt, Center for Food Safety v. Vilsak: Round-
up Ready Regulations, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 779–80 (2010) (analyzing GM sugar beets case 
prior to the Supreme Court GM alfalfa decision and questioning capacity of federal courts to 
bring about the desired substantive regulatory changes). 
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crops costly to U.S. farmers, this proliferation of the GM sugar beet has 
continued.
141
 
First harvested in the fall of 2008, GM sugar beets now “account for 
95 percent of those being grown in the United States, according to 
USDA figures.”142 “Beets supply about half” of the total U.S. sugar sup-
ply, “with the rest coming from sugar cane.”143 As a result, some have 
argued that this litigation could create a shortage of sugar production 
and “possible price increases for consumers and food processors.”144 
Americans consume about ten million tons of refined sugar each year 
and about twelve million tons of corn sweeteners such as high fructose 
corn syrup.
145
 Yet, as with other GM products, the source of these two 
leading sweeteners—GM corn and sugar beets—need not be indicated to 
consumers through labeling.
146
 Moreover, the implications for interna-
tional trade are significant because, under current European law, any 
U.S. export that contains sugar would not be accepted unless the manu-
facturer can verify through a costly traceability program that it was not 
derived from GM sugar beets.
147
 Meanwhile, due to increased demand 
for organic sugar, the USDA has just taken action to elevate imports of 
organic raw cane and specialty sugar into the United States.
148
 
                                                     
141. Dismissal of Monsanto’s Appeal, supra note 132 (discussing the fact that GM 
crops have led to an increase in herbicides and herbicide resistant weeds); see also Battle 
Lines Drawn Over GM Sugar Beets, supra note 99.  
142.  Scott-Thomas, Sugar Beet Appeal Dismissed, supra note 135; see also Sugar 
Indus. Biotech Council, supra note 115 (noting that sugar beets are planted on 1.2 million 
acres in the United States annually, supplying half of U.S. sugar, and that Roundup Ready 
sugar beets are planted on 95% of all sugar beet acreage). 
143.  Andrew Pollack, Judge Revokes Approval of Modified Sugar Beets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2010, at B1. 
144. Andrew Pollack, supra note 138. But see Scott-Thomas, Judge Rules Against 
GM Sugar Beets, supra note 107 (over 100 food companies have signed a non-GM beet sugar 
registry pledging not to knowingly use GM sugar in their products).  
145. Benefits of Current Policy, AM. SUGARBEET GROWERS ASS’N, http://www.americ 
ansugarbeet.org/us-sugar-policy/benefits-of-current-policy.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
146. Id.; see generally Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3 (analyzing the U.S. 
and EU regulatory treatment of GMOs and, in view of the health and environmental risks, 
proposing that the United States adopt a more cautious model of labeling and monitoring).  
147. Battle Lines Drawn Over GM Sugar Beets, supra note 99. For more on issues of 
international trade involving GM foods, see Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact 
of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of GM Foods, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Impact of the WTO]. See also Debra M. 
Strauss, Genetically Modified Organisms in Food: A Model of Labeling and Monitoring With 
Positive Implications for International Trade, 40 INT’L LAW. 95 (2006) [hereinafter Strauss, A 
Model of Labeling] (analyzing the differing regulatory approaches of the United States and 
the EU as a reflection of the cultural views of risk and scientific uncertainty with an impact 
on international trade).  
148. Caroline Scott-Thomas, USDA Allows Extra Specialty Sugar Imports to Meet 
Organic Sugar Demand, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.foodnavigator-
usa.com/Product-Categories/Carbohydrates-and-fibers-sugar-starches/USDA-allows-extra-
specialty-sugar-imports-to-meet-organic-sugar-demand. A recent report from Packaged Facts 
found that U.S. sales of organic foods and beverages continued to outpace conventional gro-
cery sales in 2010, with the market growing 8.5% to reach $23.2 billion retail. Natural and 
Organic Foods and Beverages in the U.S., 3rd Edition, PACKAGED FACTS (July 1, 2011), 
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C. Other Cases of Courts Policing the Agencies 
In the area of GM crops, there have been other cases of the courts 
responding to challenges to agency action or inaction, both prior to and 
after the Monsanto Supreme Court case. In the case of the creeping 
bentgrass, plaintiffs sued APHIS and officials of the USDA, including 
the Agriculture Secretary, for allowing field tests that later had dam-
aged the environment.
149
 Plaintiff organizations International Center for 
Technology Assessment, CFS, and Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center, 
along with five individual plaintiffs who resided or recreated outside of 
test plots, alleged that by permitting the field tests, APHIS had violated 
the PPA, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and NEPA.
150
 They 
claimed that APHIS had failed to consider whether this crop is a plant 
pest under the PPA, to evaluate the environmental impact under NEPA, 
and to follow its own regulations.
151
 In the summer of 2006, the creeping 
bentgrass, under development by the Scotts Miracle-Gro Company and 
Monsanto, was discovered to have escaped into the wild from Oregon 
test sites that had been used a few years earlier.
152
 The genetically engi-
neered grass (GTCB), intended for use on golf courses and not yet ap-
proved by the USDA, contained a bacterial gene that made it resistant 
to the herbicide glyphosate, sold commercially as Roundup. Apparently 
the wind had dispersed the seeds and the pollen had crossed with other 
varieties. Scientists have expressed concern that the variety will cross 
pollinate with other grass varieties and may contaminate the commer-
cial grass seed supply—70% of which is grown in Oregon.153 Another 
danger is the creation of “superweeds,” which are harder to control with 
glyphosate (a widely used herbicide), thus leading to the use of more 
toxic herbicides.
154
 In the litigation that ensued, the court held that the 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.packagedfacts.com/Natural-Organic-Foods-6057035/. According to the USDA, the 
United States is the world’s largest consumer of sweeteners, including sugar and high fruc-
tose corn syrup, and is one of the biggest sweetener importers. Id. Sugar and Sweeteners, 
USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Sugar/ (last updated Aug. 3, 2009).  
149. Int’l Ctr. For Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13 (D.D.C. 
2007). The Scotts Company intervened in the case as a defendant. Id. 
150. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–58 (2006); Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2010); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70f 
(2009). 
151. Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. 
152. Andrew Pollack, Grass Created in Lab is Found in the Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/science/16grass.html [hereinafter Pollack, 
Grass], cited in Rachel Durkee Walker & Jill Doerfler, Wild Rice: The Minnesota Legislature, 
a Distinctive Crop, GMOs, and OJIBWE Perspectives, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 518 (2009) 
(statement to Minnesota legislature citing examples of the dangers of GMOs and evidence 
that the regulators are not regulating). 
153. Smith, Whistleblower, supra note 42. 
154. Pollack, Grass, supra note 152; see also Neuman & Pollack, supra note 2. 
Roundup-resistant weeds like horseweed and giant ragweed are forcing farmers to spray 
fields with more toxic herbicides and to use more expensive techniques previously aban-
doned—more labor-intensive methods like pulling weeds and regular plowing. Margaret 
Rosso Grossman, Anticipatory Nuisance and the Prevention of Environmental Harm and 
Economic Loss from GMOs in the United States, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 107, 147–49 (2008) 
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denial of plaintiffs’ petition to list GTCB as a noxious weed was arbi-
trary and capricious, as was its failure to require an environmental im-
pact assessment.
155
 
In the first federal case to address biopharming, in August 2006, a 
district court judge ruled that drug-producing GM crops grown in Ha-
waii violated both the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and NEPA.
156
 Be-
tween 2001 and 2003, several companies had run field tests of corn and 
sugarcane genetically engineered to produce experimental vaccines, 
hormones, and cancer-fighting agents.
157
 In view of concerns for Hawaii’s 
fragile ecosystem, the court held that APHIS violated the ESA by failing 
to obtain information about endangered and threatened species in the 
permit area and violated NEPA by failing to prepare an environmental 
assessment or impact statement.
158
 However, by the time the court is-
sued its decision, the field tests had already been completed and the po-
tential damage done; thus, a declaratory judgment was the only availa-
ble relief requested. As further evidence of this type of harm, in Sep-
tember 2004, citizen groups revealed that tests of nearly 20,000 papaya 
seeds on the Big Island of Hawaii determined that half were genetically 
modified; to make matters worse, 80% were from organic farms, while 
20% were from home gardens and wild papaya trees.
159
 
In the long line of post-Monsanto cases, the courts continue to find 
unlawful agency action but generally limit the appropriate remedy for 
these violations to remand and vacatur rather than direct injunctive 
relief.
160
 For example, in Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia held that remand with partial vacatur of a 
Clean Water Act (CWA) permit was warranted to prevent significant 
harm.
161
 In that case, environmental groups sued federal agency officials 
for alleged violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), ESA, NEPA, and 
APA as a result of the Army Corps of Engineers’ (COE) issuance of a 
                                                                                                                           
(discussing this case and others as illustrating the type of environmental damage feared 
from GM crops). 
155. Int’l Ctr. For Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 29–30; see also 
Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 163. 
156. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1182–83 (D. Haw. 2006). 
See also Bernadette Tansey, Hawaii Judge Rules ‘Biopharming’ Illegal, S.F. CHRONICLE 
(Aug. 16, 2006), http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-08-15/business/17306113_1_ruling-endangere 
d-species-act-earthjustice-legal-defense-fund; Denton, supra note 26, at 361–67 (discussing 
significance of the Hawaii biopharming case).  
157. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. 
158. Id. at 1183. See also Grossman, supra note 154, at 149–51. 
159. Jeffrey M. Smith, The Myth and Necessity of GM Free Zones, SPILLING THE 
BEANS (Inst. for Responsible Tech., Fairfield, Iowa), Oct 1, 2004, http://www.nofamass.org/pr 
ograms/social/pdfs/11myths.pdf; see also Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 
163–64. 
160. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying a 
permanent injunction to preclude the State of Maine from authorizing trapping of the Cana-
da lynx, a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act). 
161. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp (Sierra Club II), 719 F. Supp. 2d 77, 78–79 (D.D.C. 
2010). 
292 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 48 
 
CWA permit for developers of a shopping mall to discharge dredged and 
fill material into wetlands.
162
 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
COE violated the CWA by issuing the permit and failing to prepare an 
EIS as required by NEPA, and by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
in its concurrence letter stating that development would not adversely 
impact four endangered species.
163
 After granting summary judgment on 
the CWA and NEPA claims, the court emphasized that the APA pro-
vides that “the reviewing court shall set aside any agency action that is 
arbitrary and capricious.”164 In determining an appropriate remedy, the 
court concluded that 
  While the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Monsanto 
that there is no presumption to other injunctive relief, both the 
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit Court have held that re-
mand, along with vacatur, is the presumptively appropriate 
remedy for a violation of the APA. Indeed, the Court in Monsan-
to assumed that a remand and vacatur of the agency’s decision 
was lawful.
165
  
Citing the four-part test set forth in the Monsanto case, and finding that 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any of these requirements, the court 
concluded that injunctive relief would be inappropriate.
166
 However, an 
injunction may still be warranted under this more stringent test, de-
pending on the factual record, as has been found in other cases.
167
 
Consumer and environmental groups continue to file cases against 
agencies for their inaction. In Center for Biological Diversity v. Animal 
& Plant Health Inspection Service & U.S. Department of Agriculture, an 
alliance of conservation organizations challenged the USDA’s approval 
of ArborGen’s biotech eucalyptus for field testing on twenty-eight secret 
                                                     
162. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp (Sierra Club I), 719 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60 (D.D.C. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 661 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
163. Id. 
164. Sierra Club II, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006)). 
165. Id. at 79 (citations omitted). 
166. Id. But cf. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 
2010). There, in an attempt to avoid the Supreme Court’s more stringent standard altogeth-
er, the Ninth Circuit concluded that preliminary injunctive relief is available as long as the 
balance of hardships “tips sharply” toward the plaintiffs. Id. at 1055. Further, it found that 
salvage logging of burnt trees would result in the “irreparabl[e]” loss of work and recreation-
al opportunities on the logged land. Id.  
167. See, e.g., Lands Council v. Cottrell, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. Idaho 2010). After 
finding that the Forest Service had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and that money dam-
ages could not compensate for the threat to species viability, the court issued an injunction 
prohibiting all commercial logging until the agency complied with NEPA and the National 
Forest Management Act. Id. See also Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Tidwell, 07-1871, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137612 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2010) (holding that the possibility of irreparable 
harm, the inadequacy of other remedies, and the public interest warranted a permanent 
injunction barring grazing cattle in Malheur National Forest that had been allowed by the 
Forest Service and National Marine Fisheries Service in violation of the ESA and NFMA). 
See also Steve Jones, Some Ninth Circuit Panels Adhere to Own Test for NEPA Injunctions, 
Despite Supreme Court Mandate, 271 ENVTL. COUNS. 2 (2011) (analyzing cases decided after 
Monsanto). 
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sites (located in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, and Texas) with only minimal environmental review.
168
 
In approving the GM eucalyptus permits, the USDA failed to heed the 
concerns of numerous agencies and scientists, including other federal 
and state governmental entities, who fear the uncontrollable spread of 
these experimental engineered trees because “eucalyptus trees are not 
native to the United States and are known to become invasive, displac-
ing native wildlife and plants in various areas around the country and 
increasing wildfire risk.”169 
Nor are such lawsuits limited to environmental agency defendants. 
A lawsuit filed by Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), Food 
Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Public Citizen, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS), and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
challenges the FDA for its failure to take action on the groups’ petitions 
asking the FDA to withdraw approvals for subtherapeutic uses of peni-
cillin and tetracyclines in animal feed.
170
 The groups charge that “the 
misuse and overuse of antibiotics has given rise to a growing and dan-
gerous trend of antibiotic resistance” and through their lawsuit seek to 
push the FDA to issue final responses to their petitions by a court-
ordered deadline.
171
 Among the outcomes of this lawsuit, one expert ob-
serves, “in its making public the history of non-action on agricultural 
antibiotic overuse, it establishes that this isn’t a scientific question any-
more, but a political one.”172 The only microbiologist in Congress, Repre-
sentative Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.), who has unsuccessfully sponsored 
legislation to limit the use of antibiotics in animal agriculture, com-
mented: 
Today’s lawsuit is an indication of the growing concern about 
the overuse of antibiotics in agriculture. We should be able to 
buy our food without worrying that eating it will expose our 
                                                     
168. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10, Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv. & USDA, No. 10-14175-
CV (S.D. Fl. filed Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.globaljusticeecology.org/files/Amended%20Comp 
laint%20(filed).pdf. 
169. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Filed to Halt Release of 
Genetically Engineered Eucalyptus Trees Across the American South (July 1, 2010), http://w 
ww.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2010/eucalyptus-07-01-2010.html. 
170. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–3, Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., et al. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, et al., No. 11 CV 3562 
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 2011). 
171. Dan Flynn, Groups Sue Over Ag Antibiotic Use, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 26, 
2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/05/big-apple-court-asked-to-take-bite-out-of-ag-
antibiotic-use/; Press Release, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Superbug Suit: 
Groups Sue FDA Over Risky Use of Human Antibiotics in Animal Feed (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2011/110525.asp. 
172. Flynn, supra note 171 (statement of Maryn McKenna, food policy journalist and 
author). See also Maryn McKenna, FDA Sued over Growth-Promoting Antibiotic Use on the 
Farm, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 31, 2011, 6:45 PM), available at http://arstechnica.com/science/ne 
ws/2011/05/fda-sued-over-growth-promoting-antibiotic-use-on-the-farm.ars. 
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families to bacteria no longer responsive to medical treatments. 
The FDA needs to take common sense steps to reduce the need-
less use of antibiotics in healthy animals, and protect human be-
ings.
173
 
 As these lawsuits against regulatory inaction proceed through the 
courts, it becomes even more evident that nothing in the Monsanto case 
precluded such judicial review. Although not calling into question the 
merits of these challenges, the courts’ application of the Monsanto non-
presumptive four-part test makes it more difficult to block agency ap-
provals that have been made without environmental analysis, even 
when the courts have ruled that such approvals violated NEPA, ESA, 
and other statutory mandates. This is particularly true in the area of 
GM crops, which by their nature are scientifically uncertain and cannot 
always be shown to engender irreparable harm. However, this higher 
hurdle is not insurmountable. As discussed above, some courts have 
found this stringent standard to be met, and issued injunctive relief if 
the factual predicate was established and balance of factors so warrant-
ed. 
D. Reaching the Limits of Judicial Oversight 
Regulating by litigation is not the most efficient method of protect-
ing consumers and the environment. Often the outcome takes years of 
procedural delays and appeals through the court system. In allowing 
planting of a GM crop through partial deregulation before an EIS is 
completed and its potential effects are fully evaluated, cases like Mon-
santo have shown that NEPA’s requirements are “essentially procedur-
al” and thus “insufficient to address all concerns relating to GMOs.”174 
In view of their requisite deference, there are limits to the courts’ juris-
diction to review agencies’ actions and to provide injunctive remedies. In 
addition, issuing injunctions on a case-by-case basis may become more 
expensive and ineffective with the growth of problems associated with 
the rise of GM crops. Moreover, since the remedies available—money 
damages or declaratory judgment—are backward-looking, the relief at 
times seems woefully inadequate in view of the irreparable harm that 
has been done. By far the preferable approach would be for the agencies 
to do the job they were given by the regulatory scheme in the first in-
stance, since they are the entities purported to possess the necessary 
scientific expertise. If that cannot be accomplished under the current 
structure, perhaps Congress can provide oversight as to the deficiencies 
                                                     
173. Flynn, supra note 171. 
174. See Claire Althouse, “Farming Out” Regulatory Responsibility: Private Parties 
in the Biotechnology Age, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 432 (2011) (arguing that GMO 
regulation is fractured both horizontally and vertically, relying on private parties to fill in 
the holes in the regulatory net, and that the GMO regulatory regime should be revised to 
reflect and optimize the role that private parties play in this public governance system). 
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and enact more specific and stringent standards and responsibilities.
175
 
As a last resort, the courts must continue in their role as a forum for the 
grievances of private litigants, as well as a backup in the event of regu-
latory default and the abdication of statutory responsibility.
176
 
As with most federal statutes, Congress included in all environ-
mental statutes judicial review provisions that allow nongovernmental 
organizations, citizens, and private entities to increase compliance with 
environmental laws through litigation.
177
 The regulatory scheme thus 
recognized the need for oversight of agency implementation of environ-
mental legislation, despite delegating powers in the agencies with broad 
statutory language and specific directives.
178
 Yet there are inherent lim-
its to judicial review under the general principles of administrative 
law.
179
 In turn, there are also limits to the power of agencies, particular-
ly in the implementation of their statutory mandates and in matters of 
creating policy.
180
 However, these limitations do not apply to Congress, 
whose oversight is necessary in order to retain the legitimacy of its 
grant of authority to these agencies.
181
 Moreover, the constrained role of 
agencies is another reason they need a clear signal from Congress about 
the seriousness of this area and the necessity for strict monitoring and 
control—along with consideration of environmental and human im-
                                                     
175. See, e.g., Allison M. Straka, Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns: Why Alfalfa is 
Not the Only Little Rascal for Bio-Agriculture Law, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 405 (2010) 
(“New laws specifically devoted to the regulation of GM agriculture must be developed, and 
the division of regulatory authority over GM agriculture must shift from APHIS to an agency 
with the scientific knowledge, experience and resources to properly assess the environmental 
effects of this technology.”). 
176. See Denton, supra note 26, at 367–69. 
177. See Robert L. Glicksman, The Constitution, the Environment, and the Prospect 
of Enhanced Executive Power, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11002, 11003 (2010) 
(citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1369(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(b), 7604(a)) (discussing sepa-
ration of powers as well as Constitutional limits of judicial review and agency power in the 
context of environmental law). 
178. Id. at 11002–03. 
179. See generally O. LEE REED ET AL., THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
OF BUSINESS 187 (15th ed. 2010) (“[C]ourts cannot interfere with the discretion given to the 
agency and cannot substitute their judgment for that of the agency. In essence, there is a 
policy of deference by the judges to the decision of the administrators.”). 
180. See, e.g., Debra M. Strauss, Reaffirming the Delaney Anticancer Clause: The 
Legal and Policy Implications of an Administratively Created De Minimis Exception, 42 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 393–94 (1987) (analyzing the role of agencies and courts in applying 
the Delaney Clause of the FDCA, which prohibits the use of carcinogenic food and color addi-
tives in the food supply, and concluding that only Congress can amend its zero risk policy); 
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (remanding to the 
EPA for further review after finding critical defects in the agency’s decision-making process 
due to its failure to make available to manufacturers in timely fashion test results and pro-
cedures used on existing plants, which formed partial basis for the emission control level 
adopted; failure to clearly identify the basis for the standards promulgated; and failure to 
respond adequately to the comments and technical objections of the cement manufacturers). 
181. See REED ET AL., supra note 179, at 187 (noting that, in determining a valid del-
egation of authority, “unlimited authority cannot be passed from Congress to an agency or 
official of the executive branch”). 
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pacts—and broad policy goals that should be followed. Congress can and 
must set clear and more definite standards, and the time is ripe to do so. 
IV. ACTION FROM CONGRESS: STEPPING UP TO THE PLATE 
There are signs that Congress may be willing to step in to assume 
its role as the architect of public policy. Beginning with the new FSMA, 
Congress has begun to set the priority of food safety and the foundation 
for a proactive policy in this area. The beams of a congressional man-
date can be observed through an examination of the FSMA, a ban on the 
approval of GE salmon, other emerging food safety laws, potential GMO 
legislation, and state initiatives that have taken hold and turned feder-
al. 
A. Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) 
The importance of these issues has been amplified by the passage 
of new legislation in this area in January 2011. Prompted by recently 
increasing incidents of contamination, the FSMA will strengthen food 
law by enlarging the powers of the FDA to inspect plants and order re-
calls. It will also require food producers to develop food safety plans, in-
cluding identifying potential risks of contamination or other hazards 
and identifying the mechanisms through which those risks would be 
controlled. The legislation establishes a food tracing system through 
which consumers can be rapidly identified and deaths and illnesses min-
imized in the event of a contamination outbreak. The tracing system 
requires farms and processors to keep records to help the government 
trace recalled foods.
182
 Strengthening restrictions on imported foods, the 
FSMA empowers the FDA to prevent foods that do not comply with U.S. 
food safety requirements from being imported, and to request inspec-
tions of overseas facilities.
183
 Most notably, the FSMA signifies a shift in 
U.S. regulatory policy from reactive to proactive.
184
 
However, the FDA is only one of the regulatory agencies in this ar-
ea. While it is responsible for overseeing 80% of the nation’s food supply 
the USDA is responsible for handling meat and poultry, products not 
covered by the new law.
185
 And, the EPA is the third “partner,” given a 
particularly prominent role in the regulation of GM crops.
186
 In addition, 
the FSMA relies upon partnerships with other constituencies, including 
local, state, and foreign governmental entities.
187
 Will this new law be 
effective in protecting our food supply? The answer hinges on the need 
                                                     
182. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 354. 
183. Id. at 358. 
184. Id. at 358 (providing a detailed analysis of the components of the FSMA, includ-
ing history of its passage and limitations it may face in the future). 
185. Id. at 354. 
186. Id. at 368. 
187. Id. at 358, 368–69; see also Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act (FSMA), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/ucm239907.htm (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2011). 
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for an integrated approach to implementation by U.S. regulatory agen-
cies and continued oversight and funding by Congress.
188
 
The FSMA represents only a first, but significant, step in improv-
ing food safety, as it is the first time in seventy years that food law has 
been changed substantially. With bipartisan support from both houses 
of Congress and the President, this new legislation represents a man-
date that food safety is at this moment becoming a priority.
189
 In light of 
this considerable movement in the right direction towards enhancing 
food safety, now is the ideal time to reexamine other food laws. Specifi-
cally, the regulation of GM foods and the use of milk and meat from 
cloned animals and their progeny—which are also allowed under cur-
rent U.S. law without labeling, preapprovals, or post-market monitor-
ing, unlike foreign countries—should be reexamined.190 In addition to 
causing agricultural trade problems,
191
 these areas warrant special reg-
ulation because they raise concerns for consumers about the safety of 
the national and global food supply.
192
 
Thus, Congress has begun to speak in this area with a mandate for 
food safety, initiating a new proactive policy on food safety—embodied 
in the FSMA—with more precautionary regulation potentially to fol-
low.
193
 
B. GE Salmon Ban from Congress 
In addition, the House of Representatives even more recently 
passed legislation to prohibit the FDA from approving GE salmon.
194
 
The FDA had been on the brink of approving GE salmon, which would 
                                                     
188. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 375.  
189. Id. at 370–72 (exploring the significance and breadth of this mandate from the 
perspectives of Congress, the President, agencies such as the FDA, food safety and consumer 
groups, and the food industry). 
190. See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 182–89 (discussing the U.S. 
laissez-faire regulatory treatment of GMOs). 
191. See Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 147 (characterizing the EC-Biotech 
dispute as a disruption in trade between the United States and EU caused by their different 
regulatory approaches toward GMOs, which are in turn a reflection of the differing views 
and levels of concern about genetically modified food in the face of scientific uncertainty); 
Debra M. Strauss & Melanie C. Strauss, Globalization and National Sovereignty: Controlling 
the International Food Supply in the Age of Biotechnology, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. BUS. 75 (2009) 
(analyzing the implications of the WTO’s food trade dispute decision on nation-state control 
in the regulation of its food supply, and multilateral environmental and trade agreements; 
concluding that the WTO has exceeded its scope of international trade and that perhaps 
another supranational organization should be formed to regulate the world’s food supply as a 
scientific and policy-making entity that would take into account public health, safety, and 
sustainability). 
192. See Strauss, A Model of Labeling, supra note 147, at 96. 
193. See Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1. 
194. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, U.S. House of Representatives Passes 
Amendment to Prohibit Genetically Engineered Salmon Approval (June 16, 2011), http://ww 
w.centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/06/16/u-s-house-of-representatives-passes-amendment-to-pro 
hibit-genetically-engineered-salmon-approval/. 
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have been the first GE food animal to be approved for human consump-
tion.
195
 Developed by AquaBounty Technologies, the AquaAdvantage 
salmon are engineered by inserting into an Atlantic salmon a growth 
gene from a Chinook salmon and an antifreeze gene from an ocean 
pout.
196
 They grow twice as fast as typical ocean pout with 10% less 
feed.
197
 The company is also developing advanced-hybrid trout and tilap-
ia.
198
 Consumers submitted nearly 400,000 public comments to the FDA 
demanding the agency deny its approval or, at the very least, require 
mandatory labeling of this transgenic salmon. Recent polls indicate that 
95% of the public want labeling of genetically-modified foods, and that 
nearly 50% of the public would not eat seafood that has been genetically 
engineered.
199
 
In response to signs the FDA would approve the GE salmon for 
human consumption, the Senate reintroduced a bill to ban GE salmon 
and a bill to require labeling if GE fish are approved.
200
 More than sixty-
seven consumer, worker, religious, and environmental groups endorsed 
the bill, along with commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries 
associations, and food businesses and retailers; earlier in the fall of 
2010, more than 300 organizations had signed joint letters to the FDA 
opposing the approval.
201
 In addition, more than forty members of Con-
gress sent letters requesting the FDA halt the approval. One of them, 
Representative Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.), stated: 
The FDA’s hastily completed approval process puts American 
consumers and the environment at risk. GE salmon could be 
devastating to fishing and coastal communities, our food source, 
and already depleted wild salmon populations. The FDA should 
                                                     
195. See id.  
196. ARCADIS U.S., INC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR AQUADVANTAGE SALM- 
ON 12 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMateri 
als/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224760.pdf. 
197. See id. at 36. 
198. See Helena Bottemiller, Senators Introduce Bill to Ban GE Salmon, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/02/senators-introduce-bill-
to-ban-genetically-engineered-salmon/.  
199. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, California Assembly Health Committee 
Passes Bill to Require Labels on Genetically Engineered Salmon (May 4, 2011), http://www. 
centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/05/04/assembly-health-committee-passes-bill-to-require-labels-
on-genetically-engineered-salmon/. 
200. S. 230, 112th Cong. (2011) (referred to the Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions) (preventing approval of genetically engineered fish); S. 229, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions) (requir-
ing labeling of genetically engineered fish). 
201. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, U.S. House of Representatives Passes 
Amendment to Prohibit Genetically Engineered Salmon Approval, supra note 194 (listing 
several of the groups that supported the Senate bill). But see Andrew Seidman, Trade 
Groups Tell Congress: Stay out of FDA Salmon Probe, LA TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, http://www.la 
times.com/news/politics/la-pn-salmon-fda-20110802,0,7205500.story?track=rss. A coalition of 
animal agriculture industry organizations sent a letter to heads of the House and Senate 
asking lawmakers not to intervene with FDA authority for “science-based regulation.” Id.  
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put the interests and safety of American families and our ocean 
resources above special interests.
202
 
Citing the lack of consideration of the potential health and safety 
issues, a group of senators (supported by environmental groups such as 
Food & Water Watch) urged the FDA to shift the approval process to the 
FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition to study the poten-
tial consequences to human health.
203
 On June 15, 2011, the House 
passed an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2012 Agriculture and FDA ap-
propriations bill, proposed by Representative Don Young (R-Ark.), to 
prohibit the use of FDA funds to grant any application for approval of 
GE salmon.
204
 
Congress has begun to intervene, and the precedent for a more 
stringent oversight has now been set. This action further supports the 
notion of a multilateral approach to food safety, consistent with a new 
strong, proactive federal policy. Through these signals, in addition to the 
courts, Congress will be more vigilant over agency action or inaction, 
and the Constitution’s principle of checks and balances can strengthen 
our resolve for a unified approach toward food safety. 
C. Other Legislation to Improve Food Safety 
Improvements in meat safety, which fall under the purview of the 
USDA, are also needed.
205
 New provisions to enhance the authority of 
the USDA, akin to those provided in the new FSMA for the FDA, would 
follow logically from the new mandate for food safety.
206
 Such powers 
should include stringent safety standards, mandatory recall authority, 
increased ability for inspections, the availability of more effective penal-
ties such as fines, and whistleblower provisions for employees through-
out the supply chain of the meatpacking industry.
207
 In the process of 
                                                     
202. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, U.S. House of Representatives Passes 
Amendment to Prohibit Genetically Engineered Salmon Approval, supra note 194 (listing 
several of the groups that supported the Senate bill). 
203. Id. (arguing that the FDA has not studied the environmental effects on Alaska’s 
wild salmon fisheries or the economic impacts on the seafood market).  
204. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012, H. Amdt. 449 to H.R. 2112, 112th Cong. (2011).  
205. See Pape, supra note 44, at 438–46. 
206. See Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1 (discussing provisions of the FSMA, demon-
strating that this legislation represents a new mandate for food safety, and proposing addi-
tional proactive legislation in furtherance of food safety). 
207. Pape, supra note 44, at 446–55. See, e.g., E. Coli Eradication Act of 2009, S. 
2792, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing testing of boneless beef manufacturing trimmings and 
ground beef) (referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry); E. coli 
Traceability and Eradication Act, H.R. 6024, 111th Cong. (2010) (referred to the Subcommit-
tee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry). See also Bill Tomson, Government Knew About Bacte-
ria in Turkey, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190 
4140604576498590579065416.html (reporting that USDA knew of salmonella contamination 
of ground turkey, but was unable to order recalls under its rules until the contamination was 
linked to injury or death).  
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ensuring these powers become a reality, the need for adequate funding 
should not be overlooked.
208
 
However, despite its statutorily defined role in protecting the safety 
of the food supply, “the predominant view by many in the agency re-
mains that production is the agency’s primary, and perhaps sole, mis-
sion.”209 For instance, the stated mission of its Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS) is “to facilitate the competitive and efficient marketing of 
agricultural products”;210 and the Administrator of AMS in testimony to 
Congress insisted that “AMS is not a food safety agency.”211 Yet these 
agency statements contradict “its responsibility for grading and labeling 
eggs, quarterly plant inspections, developing sanitation and good manu-
facturing practices, and implementing industry-developed safety pro-
grams—clear examples of food safety responsibilities.”212 
Moreover, there are signs that the USDA may be resisting any in-
crease in its authority. The USDA’s decision to grant nationwide ap-
proval of GM alfalfa was based upon its “limited authority” which con-
fines its scope to “plant pest” risks.213 In the GM eucalyptus trees action, 
the CFS has urged the USDA to use the 2008 Farm Bill, which has not 
been fully implemented by the USDA, to expand its regulatory oversight 
to include consideration of “other effects” of “noxious weeds.”214 Congres-
sional reaction has been divergent. Regarding the GM sugar beets deci-
sion, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Representative Peter DeFazio 
(D-Or.) wrote to Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack expressing “serious 
concern” over the proposed EIS which supported the deregulation of 
RRA, stating that “[w]e have concluded that [the] USDA’s preliminary 
                                                     
208. Funding is a problem anticipated potentially to hamper the FDA, even with its 
enhanced role under the FSMA. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 365–66; see also Molly 
Peterson & Alan Bierga, FDA Seeks $1.4 Billion for Food-Safety Law as Budget Faces Cuts, 
BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-06/fda-seeks-1-4-billion-
for-food-safety-law-as-budget-faces-cuts.html; Deficit Focus Coming at Expense of Food Safe-
ty?, CBS NEWS (July 5, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/06/30/earlyshow/mai 
n20075715.shtml. 
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210. Agency Mission Statement, USDA AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., http://www.ams.usda. 
gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navID=AMSMissionStatem
ent&rightNav1=AMSMissionStatement&topNav=AboutAMS&leftNav=&page=AboutAMSM
issionStatement&resultType=&acct=AMSPW (last visited Nov. 1 2011). 
211. Rayne Pegg, Adm’r., Agric. Mktg. Serv., Ready to Eat or Not? Examining the 
Impact of Leafy Green Marketing Agreements, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic 
Policy of the H. Comm. of Oversight and Gov’t Reform (July 29, 2009), http://republicans.ov 
ersight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090729Pegg.pdf. 
212. Endres & Johnson, supra note 209, at 44. 
213. Jillian Hishaw & Thomas P. Redick, Case Law Update: Biotech Crops, RBST, 
Farmland Preservation, and the CAFO Rule, ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. 
Bar Ass’n, Section of Envt., Energy, & Res., Agric. Mgmt. Committee, Chi., Ill.), May 2011, at 
3, 5.  
214. Id.; see Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, Tit. X 
§ 10204, 122 Stat. 1651, 2105 (“2008 Farm Bill”). 
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finding of ‘No Significant Impact’ cannot be justified.”215 Citing “new au-
thority under the 2008 Farm Bill to bolster regulation of GM plant 
products[, the letter] complains that the Department of Agriculture has 
failed to adopt regulations appropriately implementing that authori-
ty.”216 In contrast, Senators Blanche Lincoln (D-Ark.), chair of the Sen-
ate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, and Saxby 
Chambliss (R-Ga.), the committee’s ranking member, wrote to Secretary 
Vilsack that “[d]espite countless findings and studies confirming the 
safety of genetically engineered crops, recent wrongly-decided court de-
cisions threaten to thrust the U.S. regulatory system for agricultural 
biotechnology into a non-functioning regulatory system.”217 Referencing 
the Geertson Seed Farms decision, the senators encouraged the USDA 
and the U.S. Department of Justice “to continue to mount vigorous de-
fenses against lawsuits that seek to upend science-based regulatory de-
cisions.”218 This split in Congress, along with mounting pressures on the 
USDA from the industry, necessitates hearings and debate in a public 
forum with the goal of promulgating clear and specific statutory guid-
ance for these agencies. 
It is increasingly apparent that the agencies are not policing food 
safety adequately because they are following the vague standards that 
apply to the agricultural industry generally. This observation presents 
another reason for federal legislation that is more stringent and specific. 
Perhaps in no area is the need more pressing than for GMOs (particu-
larly GM crops), which warrant separate and tailored statutory direc-
tives and regulations. As evidenced by these incidents and lawsuits, 
which have established the dangers of pollen drift, the EIS mechanism 
does not provide adequate protection. 
D. Federal Legislation on GMOs 
During the most recent five-year period reported by the Pew Initia-
tive on Food and Biotechnology (PIFB) (2001–2006), the only bills 
passed at the federal level that have concerned GMOs have supported 
biotechnology.
219
 None of the GM-restrictive legislation in this area was 
                                                     
215.  Letter from Patrick Leahy, Senator, and Peter Defazio, Representative, to Tom 
Vilsack, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (June 23, 2010), http://www.defazio.house.gov/index.php?o 
ption=com_content&task=view&id=590.  
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 5–6. 
218. Id. at 6. 
219. Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Legislative Activity 2001-2006 Re-
lated to Agricultural Biotechnology (Feb. 2007), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ww 
wpewtrustsorg/Fact_Sheets/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_Legislative_Tracker.pdf [herein-
after PIFB Legislative Tracker]. It should be noted that this data is the most recent that is 
available at this comprehensive level because the grant for the Pew Initiative ended in 
March 2006. In its final report, the organization stated, “The nonprofit Pew Initiative on 
Food and Biotechnology is closing, but the need for an independent and neutral body to facil-
itate dialogue on U.S. biotech policy has never been greater.” The PEW Charitable Trusts, 
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enacted, but several bills were introduced.
220
 In May 2002, H.R. 4814 
was one of five bills introduced by Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-
Ohio) that sought to expand the regulation of agricultural biotechnolo-
gy.
221
 H.R. 4812, the Genetically Engineered Crop and Animal Farmer 
Protection Act, would “provide additional protections for farmers and 
ranchers that may be harmed economically by genetically engineered 
seeds, plants, or animals,” establishing a Farmer’s Bill of Rights “to en-
sure fairness for farmers and ranchers in their dealings with biotech 
companies that sell genetically engineered seeds, plants, or animals.”222 
Among these protections, the bill would require biotechnology compa-
nies to disclose the legal and environmental risks that the use of the 
genetically engineered seeds, plants, or animals may pose to the con-
sumer; prevent noncompetitive practices involving technology fees; pre-
clude biotechnology companies from limiting liability for harm that may 
result from the release of genetically engineered material into the envi-
ronment; and prohibit the sale of certain nonfertile plant seeds (a seed 
that is genetically engineered to produce a plant whose seeds are not 
capable of reproduction). Finally, H.R. 4816, the Genetically Engineered 
Organism Liability Act, would hold biotechnology companies liable to 
any party for injuries caused by the release of a genetically engineered 
organism into the environment.
223
 The potential injuries include crop 
failures suffered by farmers, cross pollination of neighboring farms, and 
increased insect resistance, as well as health and environmental im-
pacts on consumers.
224
 All of these proposals died in subcommittees.
225
 
Nevertheless, Rep. Kucinich again introduced similar bills in the 
111th Congress.
226
 The purpose of one of these bills was: 
To provide additional protections for farmers and ranchers that 
may be harmed economically by genetically engineered seeds, 
plants, or animals, to ensure fairness for farmers and ranchers 
in their dealings with biotech companies that sell genetically 
engineered seeds, plants, or animals, to assign liability for inju-
                                                                                                                           
Lessons Learned: Food for Thought and Discussion, TRUST MAGAZINE, Fall 2007, available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=32992. 
220. PIFB Legislative Tracker, supra note 219. 
221. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 4814, 107th Cong. (2002). 
222. Genetically Engineered Crop and Animal Farmer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 
4812, 107th Cong. (2002). 
223. Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2002, H.R. 4816, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
224. Id. 
225. Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 171. 
226. Genetically Engineered Technology Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 5579, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (referred to the Committee on Agriculture and the Committees on Energy and 
Commerce); Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 5577, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(referred to the Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry); Genetically Engineered 
Safety Act-Genetically Engineered Pharmaceutical and Industrial Crop Safety Act of 2010, 
H.R. 5578, 111th Cong. (2010) (referred to the Subcommittee on Rural Development, Bio-
technology, Specialty Crops, and Foreign Agriculture). 
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ry caused by genetically engineered organisms, and for other 
purposes.
227
 
The Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2010 further 
states that: (1) “A biotech company [shall be] liable to any party injured 
by the release of a genetically engineered organism into the environ-
ment if the injury results from such genetic engineering;” and (2) “liabil-
ity may not be waived or otherwise avoided by contract.”228 No further 
action has been taken since the end of 2010, when the bills were submit-
ted to the appropriate House committees. 
There are some signs that the recent climate of food safety may 
translate into further changes in the law. Currently, Congress is consid-
ering such issues as “food safety initiatives covering meat, poultry, and 
seafood products; legislation intended to curtail the non-medical use of 
antibiotics in animal feeds and to ban the use of certain plastic compo-
nents commonly used in food containers; food labeling; and the use of 
plant and animal biotechnology.”229 
“In the area of [GM] food, although supporters of this technology 
from agricultural states have previously prevailed, the new focus on 
safety issues may turn the tide to scrutinize the adequacy of a U.S. reg-
ulatory framework that predates the advent of agricultural biotechnolo-
gy.”230 Ongoing issues associated with the widespread use of GM crops 
include concerns about increased herbicide resistant weeds as well as 
the cross-contamination of other traditional and organically grown 
crops.
231
 As discussed above, the predominant GM legislation introduced 
in the current Congress recently resulted in passage of a bill against 
FDA approval of GE salmon.
232
 Meanwhile Congress can be expected to 
continue to deliberate on other bills involving GMOs.
233
 
E. State Initiatives Effectively Turn Federal 
State legislatures have been more active than Congress in develop-
ing GM regulation, and at times these initiatives have taken hold and 
effectively spurred a federal response. For example, in the GE salmon 
                                                     
227. Genetically Engineered Technology Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 5579, 111th 
Cong. (2010).  
228. Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2010, H.R. 5579, 111th Cong. 
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230. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 375.  
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232. See supra Section IV.B. 
233. See, e.g., Dallas Duncan, Genetically Engineered Food Sparks ‘Vigorous De-
bate’, REDANDBLACK.COM (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.redandblack.com/2011/01/25/geneticall 
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legislation, federal action followed passage of a bill in the California As-
sembly Health Committee.
234
 Prompted by the FDA’s imminent approv-
al of the proposed commercialization of GE salmon, the California As-
sembly Health Committee bill (AB 88) would require that all GE fish 
sold in California contain clear and prominent labeling.
235
 The CFS, co-
sponsor of the bill, explained its importance: 
The FDA has indicated that it will not require these GE fish to 
be labeled once they are approved. . . . As such, it is incumbent 
on the California State legislature, starting with the Health 
Committee, to let the people of California make informed choices 
about the food they eat by requiring the labeling of GE fish sold 
in California.
236
 
In the midst of public outcry for mandatory labeling of the untested 
transgenic salmon—the first genetically engineered animal intended for 
human consumption—the CFS cited California as a leader in environ-
mental and food safety laws to protect the public from potentially harm-
ful food technology and to employ labeling as a means to give consumers 
a choice in the marketplace.
237
 In a subsequent development, the Cali-
fornia Assembly decided to hold the bill after it did not garner enough 
votes to pass in the Appropriations Committee.
238
 The Committee noted, 
however, the widespread support for the bill, particularly from consum-
er letters, and expressed optimism that it would become law the next 
year.
239
 Soon after, the parallel federal bill passed in the House of Rep-
resentatives.
240
 
Another state-initiated standard originated in California with let-
tuce and spinach producers who seek to unify farm safety standards na-
tionwide.
241
 The USDA formally proposed a “leafy greens marketing 
agreement” that would essentially extend California’s leafy greens regu-
latory system across the United States.
242
 The California Leafy Green 
Marketing Agreement, launched after a widespread E. coli outbreak in 
2006, encompasses almost all of the lettuce and spinach produced in the 
state.
243
 The federal version, although voluntary, would set binding 
standards on everyone who joined, covering “recordkeeping, soil testing, 
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and field sanitation requirements.”244 The marketing agreement would 
be “[g]overned by a 26-member board, including as many as seven han-
dlers and producers from California.”245 In a formal statement, the 
Western Growers Association and other farm groups reacted positively 
to the development: “It is encouraging to know the USDA has come to 
this point.”246 A local agricultural economist testified during hearings 
conducted by the Agriculture Department, identifying a “labyrinth” of 
competing safety rules and stating: “In the absence of one universally 
accepted set of standards, producers and food providers are often faced 
with having to comply with a different set of standards for different cus-
tomers.”247 
The most recent PIFB report on state legislative activity indicates 
that initiatives grew exponentially at the state and local levels.
248
 Mi-
chael Fernandez, executive director of the Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology, explained: “As agricultural biotechnology progresses, and 
farmers, the food industry and consumers continue to adapt to it, state 
legislatures are at the forefront. States sometimes have little choice but 
to address new policy issues, even before they emerge at the federal lev-
el.”249 State legislatures increasingly introduced bills that attempted to 
preempt local and county initiatives to limit or prohibit GM seeds and 
crops, prompted by concerns that local regulations could be inconsistent 
with, and more restrictive than, statewide policies.
250
 
In addition, states sought to balance the competing interests of dif-
ferent stakeholders. While many of the bills supported agricultural bio-
technology as a means of promoting economic growth, others aimed to 
manage the potential economic conflicts between farmers who use GM 
crops and those using conventional or organic techniques. This category 
of “liability and contracts” encompassed 15% of the bills introduced in 
2005–2006 and 11% of adopted legislation in 2005–2006, compared to 
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3% in 2003–2004.251 Most notable was legislation proposed in Vermont 
(“the Farmer Protection Act”) that was vetoed by the Governor. Prompt-
ed by concerns about the “unintended presence of GM crops in conven-
tional and organic crops,” this bill (SB 18) would have held manufactur-
ers strictly liable for damage caused by GM material, while an alternate 
House version (H.B. 309) “would have required that manufacturers be 
negligent to be held responsible.”252 Some of the proposed legislation 
aimed to “impose moratoria on GM crops and animals” (16%, as com-
pared to 6% in 2003–2004); “8% proposed to impose labeling require-
ments (compared to 7%); 9% involved studies and taskforces (compared 
to 19%); and 1% concerned crop destruction (compared to a similarly 
small number in 2003–2004).”253 Through these conflicting bills, the 
states attempted to implement coexistence strategies.
254
 
Of the total bills and resolutions introduced in state legislatures in 
2005–2006, twenty-seven (20%) passed.255 Most of the new state laws 
supported biotechnology, disallowed local and county initiatives, or 
criminalized the destruction of crops.
256
 Only a few of the many labeling 
bills introduced were adopted: Alaska enacted a labeling statute (SB 
25), which requires that GM fish be conspicuously labeled before being 
sold for human consumption;
257
 Maine provided for voluntary labeling of 
foods designated as GM free (LD 1733);
258
 and Vermont mandated label-
ing of seed as GM (HB 777).
259
 In addition, one bill on the subject of lia-
bility and agricultural contracts previously became law in Illinois.
260
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Calls have been renewed for a greater statutory response, particu-
larly at the state level.
261
 Some experts prefer these decisions be made 
by the legislatures rather than the courts: “An appropriate statutory 
and regulatory regime enacted with the purpose of establishing stand-
ards of care for growers of GE crops would place the important policy 
questions presented by gene flow squarely in the hands of the political 
branches of government.”262 Grassroots local efforts carry great potential 
to take hold and expand further into a federal regulatory scheme. As the 
voice of consumers grows stronger, and as word of contamination and 
potentially other incidents spreads, so do the prospects that the United 
States may react to a changing political climate with the passage of new 
federal and state legislation that restricts the continued proliferation of 
GM crops, requires labeling of GM ingredients, and clearly defines lia-
bility for the future harms caused by GMOs in food.
263
 
V. OTHER CONSTITUENCIES PROVIDE A DRIVING FORCE 
As governmental agencies appear to take an ever more passive role 
in the regulation of genetically engineered foods, other stakeholders in-
creasingly attempt to fill the void. Most recently, these constituents 
have included trade associations acting in their industries’ best interests 
with suppliers demanding non-GM ingredients, the organics industry 
proactively pressing for protection through preemptive litigation against 
Monsanto, and consumer-driven demands expressed through organic 
and non-GMO sales. 
A. The Impact of Trade Associations and Suppliers 
Trade associations and suppliers have increasingly provided a voice 
that has shaped the actions of government agencies and industry play-
ers in this area. As seen in the grassroots push against GE salmon, fish-
ing associations, food companies, restaurants, and organizations pro-
moting environmental protection, consumer interests, health, and ani-
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308 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 48 
 
mal welfare, all played a role in activating legislation at both the state 
and federal level.
264
 In addition, an industry registry for non-GM sugar 
sources has been established and joined by over seventy food companies 
and retailers: the Non-GM Sugar Beet Registry notifies consumers of its 
members’ intention to avoid GM beet sugar.265 Through consumer peti-
tions, organizations such as CFS solicit the assurances of additional 
companies that they will commit to avoiding GM sugar.
266
 With a simi-
lar approach, CFS has organized a consumer boycott—targeting the 
dairy industry—of dairy products derived from cows that are fed GM 
alfalfa; through petitions they seek to obtain industry pledges to use 
only non-GM alfalfa.
267
 Another organizational initiative promotes non-
GM lunches in local schools.
268
 
In the absence of government regulation, the market has also in-
tervened through measures such as a voluntary non-GMO certifica-
tion.
269
 Suppliers and manufacturers who seek to assure their buyers 
and consumers that their products do not contain GMOs are increasing-
ly utilizing third-party certification programs.
270
 A new “Non-GMO Pro-
ject Verified” seal offers third-party testing and certification that less 
than 0.9% of the product ingredients came from GMOs. More than 2000 
products have been verified in the program and another 2000 are in pro-
cess.
271
 These industry initiatives do indeed speak volumes.
272
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B. Organics Industry Litigation for Changing Tide 
In a novel case filed recently, the organics industry is going on the 
offensive against Monsanto as a preemptive strike on future damages 
and the validity of its patents.
273
 Against a legal landscape in which 
Monsanto has aggressively pursued farmers for patent infringement in 
incidents of “unintentional seed drift into their fields (a scenario that 
could more appropriately be viewed as contamination warranting a 
countersuit by the farmer),” a group of farmers is challenging the com-
pany’s patents for GM seeds.274 The farmers contend that wind-blown 
pollen from gene-altered crops can contaminate organic plants; as a re-
sult, organic canola is “virtually extinct,” and there are concerns that 
corn, soybeans, cotton, sugar beets, and alfalfa will also suffer this 
fate.
275
 
In Organic Seed Growers & Trade Association v. Monsanto Co., 
these plaintiffs, who represent a “broad array of the organic and conven-
tional agriculture community,” in total 36 agriculture and food safety 
membership organizations, 14 seed businesses, and 33 farms and farm-
ers, are challenging the validity of Monsanto’s GM patents, claiming 
that the patents fail to meet the constitutional and patent law require-
ment of utility or usefulness.
276
 The plaintiffs, represented by Daniel 
Ravicher of the Public Patent Foundation (PUBPAT), are seeking a de-
claratory judgment that Monsanto’s transgenic seed patents are invalid 
and cannot be enforced. Under the Patent Act, “an invention is ‘useful’ if 
it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit,” and this standard 
                                                                                                                           
272. See, e.g., Inst. for Responsible Tech., NON-GMO SHOPPING GUIDE (2011), http:// 
www.nongmoshoppingguide.com/Non-GMO-Shopping-Guide.pdf (listing products and brands 
participating in the Non-GMO Project, a non-profit organization committed to providing 
consumers with clearly labeled and independently verified non-GMO choices including test-
ing of at-risk ingredients). 
273. See David Bario, Seeds of Discontent, SAVE OUR SEEDS (Apr. 11, 2011), http://sa 
veourseeds.com/?p=56; Ethan A. Huff, Organic Groups, Farmers File Preemptive Lawsuit 
Against Monsanto to Protect Themselves from Inevitable Destruction by GMOs, 
NATURALNEWS.COM (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.naturalnews.com/031922_Monsanto_lawsuit. 
html. 
274. See Debra M. Strauss, The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intel-
lectual Property Rights and Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287, 299 (2009) [hereinafter 
Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights] (parentheses added) (discussing the 
inappropriate use of patent protection for GM seeds as in the case of Percy Schmeiser). But 
see Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 156–60 (analyzing the LibertyLink rice 
litigation where farmers successfully sued for contamination of the national rice crop). 
275. Susan Decker & Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Sued by Organic Farmers Over Modi-
fied-Seed Patents, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
29/monsanto-sued-by-organic-farmers-over-modified-seed-patents-1-.html. 
276. First Amended Complaint at ¶ 11, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n et al. v. 
Monsanto Co., No. 11-CV-02163-NRB (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011); Press Release, Ctr. for Food 
Safety, Family Farmers Amplify Complaint Against Monsanto’s GMOs, Reinforcing Their 
Arguments with Two Dozen Additional Plaintiffs (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.cent 
erforfoodsafety.org/2011/06/01/family-farmers-amplify-complaint-against-monsanto%E2%80 
%99s-gmos-reinforcing-their-arguments-with-two-dozen-additional-plaintiffs/. 
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for utility cannot be met until a “specific benefit exists in currently 
available form.”277 Citing a historic case that defined the patent utility 
doctrine as rejecting inventions that “poison people” or are “injurious to 
the wellbeing, good policy, or sound morals of society,” the plaintiffs 
claim that the GM seeds do not produce the alleged benefits.
278
 Addi-
tionally, plaintiffs assert that the GM seeds fail to increase crop yield 
and, instead of reducing herbicide and pesticide use, actually promote 
pesticide use and plant tolerance to chemicals, causing farmers to spray 
their crops more heavily.
279
 According to the complaint, “since the harm 
of transgenic seed is known, and the promises of transgenic seed’s bene-
fits are false, transgenic seed is not useful for society.”280 
It remains to be seen whether this innovative argument will be 
able to turn back the clock on the proliferation of patents for genetically 
engineered plants, but the lawsuit documents many of the hazards and 
represents a new offensive against Monsanto’s aggressive enforcement 
tactics. The plaintiffs also allege that the transgenic seed patents are 
unenforceable because Monsanto misuses its intellectual property 
through “abusive litigation practices and anticompetitive licensing 
agreements.”281 If the plaintiffs prevail, they will be able to pursue fur-
ther cases against the company for contamination without the threat of 
reprisals for having the unwanted presence of the patented seed in their 
fields.
282
 As courts give increased scrutiny to actions taken by govern-
                                                     
277. First Amended Complaint, supra note 276, ¶ 144 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 
383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966)). The Complaint also recites, “[t]he Patent Act provides that 
‘[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,’ may obtain a patent on the 
invention or discovery.” Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)) (emphasis in original). 
278. First Amended Complaint, supra note 276, ¶ 144 (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. 
Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (Story, J.)). 
279. Bario, supra note 273; Neuman & Pollack, supra note 2; see also Strauss, Ethi-
cal Implications, supra note 13, at 7–19 (contrasting the false promise that this technology 
would reduce world hunger, decrease pesticide usage, improve nutritional content, and in-
crease farmers’ income with the actual and potential risks). 
280. First Amended Complaint, supra note 276, ¶ 125; see also Strauss, Internation-
al Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 241, at 316–20 (proposing an approach for patents 
in the area of GM plants and seeds that would reward socially responsible technology with 
the goal of promoting not only trade but innovation for the public benefit). 
281. Bario, supra note 273; First Amended Complaint, supra note 276, ¶¶ 151–56. 
282. Huff, supra note 273. But see Monsanto, PUBPAT Allegations are False, Mis-
leading and Deceptive, BEYOND THE ROWS (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.monsantoblog.com/20 
11/03/29/pubpat-allegations-are-false-misleading-and-deceptive/ (claiming that “[i]t has nev-
er been, nor will it be Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts of 
our patented seed or traits are present in farmer’s fields as a result of inadvertent means”). 
Plaintiffs interpret the ambiguity of the phrase “trace amounts” as further evidence of an 
veiled threat that Monsanto will continue to pursue actions against “certified organic and 
nontransgenic seed farmers who come to possess more than ‘trace amounts’ of Monsanto’s 
transgenic seed, even if it is not their fault.” First Amended Complaint, supra note 276, ¶¶ 
158–59. See also Ctr. for Food Safety, Family Farmers Amplify Complaint Against Monsan-
to’s GMOs, supra note 276 (citing correspondence from Monsanto’s attorneys, attached to 
Amended Complaint, refusing plaintiffs’ request to make its promise legally binding). In 
subsequent developments, on February 27, 2012, District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald dis-
missed this lawsuit for lack of standing, and on March 28, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an appeal 
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ment agencies, in this case the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, they 
are uniquely positioned to account for public policy considerations that 
may reverse the government’s pro-biotechnology stance.283 
C. Consumer Driven Demands 
Ultimately, it may be the consumer through the marketplace that 
determines the boundaries in this area. However, such an approach pre-
cariously relies on the education of the consumer and access to accurate 
information, most of which is held exclusively by the biotechnology in-
dustry. 
Nevertheless, the purchase power of consumers in choosing organ-
ics and non-GMO is speaking effectively with increasing sales. For ex-
ample, “[p]olls taken by the Pew Center, Consumers Union, Harris In-
teractive and ABC over the last decade have consistently found that the 
vast majority of Americans would like to see GM foods better regulated 
and labeled.”284 Moreover, “‘non-GMO’ was the fastest-growing health 
and wellness claim on store-brand foods in 2009, up by 67% from the 
previous year and representing $60.2 million in sales.”285 Significantly, 
the organic industry, currently generating $25 billion a year, has been 
the fastest growing sector of U.S. agriculture for more than a decade.
286
 
These trends should highlight to the government the mandate of 
the American public, whose health and safety it is duty-bound to pro-
tect. In the past, the FDA has pointed to organic food as the solution for 
those who are concerned about such issues. However, this attitude is 
inappropriate, because organic food is not readily available to all con-
                                                                                                                           
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Farmers Determined to Defend 
Right to Grow Food—File Appeal in OSGATA v. Monsanto, ORGANIC SEED GROWERS & 
TRADE ASS’N (March 28, 2012), http://www.osgata.org/farmers-determined-to-defend-right-to-
grow-food-file-appeal-in-osgata-vs-monsanto. 
283. See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (invalidating two gene patents by Myriad Genetics, BRCA1 
and BRCA2, both associated with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, on the grounds that 
the public would be better served by sharing information to lead to further research and 
innovation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 2010-1406, slip op. (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (af-
firming portion that held Myriad’s method claims directed to “comparing” or “analyzing” 
DNA sequences are patent ineligible), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stori 
es/opinions-orders/10-1406.pdf; Sharon Begley, In Surprise Ruling, Court Declares Two Gene 
Patents Invalid, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/n 
ewsweek/blogs/the-human-condition/2010/03/29/in-surprise-ruling-court-declares-two-gene-
patents-invalid.html; Divided Appeals Court Rules That Companies May Patent Breast Can-
cer Genes, but Invalidates Patents on Comparing the Genes, ACLU (July 29, 2011), http://w 
ww.aclu.org/print/womens-rights/divided-appeals-court-rules-companies-may-patent-breast-
cancer-genes-invalidates. 
284. Eng, supra note 11. 
285. Id. 
286. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Organic Industry Supports CFS in GE Sug-
ar Beets Appeal, supra note 118; see also Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Farmers and 
Consumer Groups File Lawsuit Challenging Genetically Engineered Alfalfa Approval, supra 
note 89 (organic sector growing 20% annually). 
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sumers due to geographical limitations and higher prices. In addition, as 
discussed above, genetic contamination increasingly threatens the in-
tegrity and economic viability of the organic food supply. Most of all, 
such statements fail to recognize—and indeed neglect—the responsibil-
ity of the government to protect the mainstream food supply for the av-
erage citizen.
287
 
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW MULTILATERAL, UNIFIED 
APPROACH 
Perhaps some of the weakness of the current food legal regime can 
be transformed into its strength. A fractionated treatment could evolve 
into a multilateral, unified approach accompanied by a new strong fed-
eral statutory policy mandate. In exploring this potential shift, policy-
makers should include consideration of non-governmental partners who 
could bring valuable expertise and varied perspectives to the table. 
A. Broader Involvement of Other Governmental Branches 
Wide participation of all branches of government along with agen-
cies, at both the state and federal level, would tap into the wisdom of the 
founders of this country to distribute responsibility vertically, through 
federalism, and horizontally, through separation of powers, thereby en-
suring numerous eyes are “watching the soup” and contributing to the 
common good of food safety. 
Critics have observed that food policy and its implementation are 
too fractionated,
288
 and that “[t]his fragmented federal system makes 
communication, efficiency and uniformity almost impossible during an 
                                                     
287. See Strauss, Ethical Implications, supra note 13, at 28. 
288. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 368–69. In the United States, food safety is 
regulated by 30 federal statutes, 15 federal agencies, and 400 state agencies. Hearing to 
Review Current Food Safety Systems Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 50–
57 (2009) (statement of Carol L. Tucker-Foreman, Distinguished Fellow, The Food Policy 
Institute at Consumer Federation of America), cited in Sara M. Benson, Guidance for Im-
proving the Federal Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Fresh Pro-
duce, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503, 504 (2010) (providing guidelines and suggestions for improv-
ing the way the FDA and CDC respond to foodborne illness outbreaks caused by fresh pro-
duce); see also Caroline Scott-Thomas, Food Safety Fragmentation Still a Problem Says 
GAO, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Legislat 
ion/Food-safety-fragmentation-still-a-problem-says-GAO; Sandra Hoffmann, Food Safety 
Policy and Economics: A Review of the Literature 14 (Research for the Future, Discussion 
Paper 1036, 2010), http://indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/Food%20Safety%20Policy.pdf; 
Nathan M. Trexler, Note, “Market” Regulation: Confronting Industrial Agriculture’s Food 
Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 314 (2011) (proposing a framework for reform of 
U.S. food safety by prioritizing prevention, strengthening surveillance and enforcement, 
improving response and recovery, and increasing support of local food systems). 
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emergency.”289 As a consequence, the need for better coordination is par-
amount.
290
 
In every Congress since the 105th, the idea of a single federal food 
agency has been debated.
291
 According to the CFS, a separate and effec-
tive government agency dedicated to food safety must be established, 
such that “[w]e need to separate out the ‘Food’ part of the Food and 
Drug Administration and consolidate all authority under a new Food 
Safety Agency.”292 Others question the limits of the FDA in terms of its 
scientific expertise.
293
 However, in an area of such complexity with over-
lapping and intersecting spheres of expertise (e.g., food and components, 
plants, environmental hazards), perhaps the effort would be better 
spent on improving coordination, communication, and management un-
der a common mandate rather than creating yet another administrative 
agency. At the very least, in keeping with the new directive on food safe-
ty, the regulations and authority of these agencies should be reex-
amined. 
Bringing together these agencies in a coordinated effort is a goal of 
President Obama in establishing the Food Safety Working Group 
(FSWG), which was created in March 2009 to advise the president on 
modernizing food safety laws in the United States.
294
 Chaired by the 
Secretary of HHS and the Secretary of Agriculture, the FSWG is “rec-
                                                     
289. Benson, supra note 288, at 504; see also Note, Reforming the Food Safety Sys-
tem: What If Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1345–47 (2007). 
290. See, e.g., Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React? A Game Plan for Modernizing the 
Food Safety System in the United States, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 402 (2004) (“Experts 
widely recognize that prevention of foodborne illness and management of such problems as 
mad cow disease and bioterrorism require an integrated, systems approach from farm to 
table and should harness the tools of research, regulation, and education in a coherent strat-
egy. This is made impossible by the current organizational fragmentation of the system, 
which divides food safety leadership and defeats accountability for the system’s successes 
and failures.”). 
291. JOHNSON, CRS REPORT R41629, supra note 229, at 13 (explaining that while 
some continue to push for this level of consolidation on the grounds that it would improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of food safety regulation, others worry that it could “unnecessari-
ly compromise day-to-day food safety efforts.”). See, e.g., Single Food Safety Agency Act of 
2010, H.R. 6552, 111th Cong. (2010); Richard J. Durbin, Food Safety Oversight for the 21st 
Century: The Creation of a Single, Independent Federal Food Safety Agency, 59 FOOD & 
DRUG L. J. 383, 383 (2004). 
292. Food Safety Modernization Bill Q & A, Ctr. for Food Safety, http://truefoodnow. 
org/campaigns/food-safety/food-safety-modernization-bill-qa/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (list-
ing amendments added to support small farmers and processors who sell directly to consum-
ers and end users); see also Sandra B. Eskin, Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket: Egg 
Safety and the Case for a Single Food Safety Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 441 (2004); Mer-
rill & Francer, supra note 26, at 115–36 (discussing the historical origins of the federal food 
safety bureaucracy and proposing a plan for consolidation). 
293. Erik Stokstad, Food Safety Law Will Likely Strain FDA Science, 331 SCIENCE 
270 (2011). See generally ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY: THE ROLE OF THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (Robert B. Wallace & Maria Oria, eds., 2010). 
294. Scott-Thomas, Food Safety Fragmentation Still a Problem Says GAO, supra 
note 288; PRESIDENT’S FOOD SAFETY WORKING GRP., http://www.foodsafetyworkinggroup. 
gov/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
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ommending a new, public health-focused approach to food safety based 
on three core principles: prioritizing prevention; strengthening surveil-
lance and enforcement; and improving response and recovery.”295 
A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded that more work needs to be done to address fragmented over-
sight of U.S. food safety:
296
 
Through the FSWG, federal agencies have taken steps designed 
to increase collaboration in some areas that cross regulatory ju-
risdictions––in particular, improving produce safety, reducing 
Salmonella contamination, and developing food safety perfor-
mance measures. However, the FSWG has not developed a gov-
ernmentwide performance plan for food safety that provides a 
comprehensive picture of the federal government’s food safety ef-
forts.
297
 
Regarding the new FSMA, the GAO observed that it “strengthens a ma-
jor part of the food safety system; however, it does not apply to the fed-
eral food safety system as a whole or create a new risk-based food safety 
structure.”298 
As a consequence of this substantial action for securing food safety, 
the moment has come for a reassessment of other areas of food laws, as 
well as the roles these agencies will play together in implementing their 
charge.
299
 This coalition could include state enforcement actions, for 
which there has been some precedent in other areas where agency inac-
tion has expanded avenues of judicial review.
300
 In order for this multi-
lateral approach to succeed, policymakers will need to set the same clear 
                                                     
295. About the President’s Food Safety Working Group (FSWG), PRESIDENT’S FOOD 
SAFETY WORKING GRP., http://www.foodsafetyworkinggroup.gov/ContentAboutFSWG/Home 
About.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
296. Scott-Thomas, Food Safety Fragmentation Still a Problem Says GAO, supra 
note 288 (citing U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO), Report to Congressional Committees, 
Federal Food Safety Oversight: Food Safety Working Group Is a Positive First Step but Gov-
ernmentwide Planning Is Needed to Address Fragmentation GAO-11-289 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11289.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]); see also Teddi Dineley 
Johnson, 2012 Budget Proposal Would Mean Cuts for Public Health: CDC Programs Slated 
for Reduction, 41 THE NATION’S HEALTH 1 (Apr. 2011), http://thenationshealth.aphapublicati 
ons.org/content/41/3/1.4.full (President’s proposed budget seeks to strengthen the President’s 
Food Safety Working Group as well as to fund key provisions of the FSMA). See generally 
GAO, Federal Food Safety and Security System: Fundamental Restructuring is Needed to 
Address Fragmentation and Overlap, GAO-04-588T, at 7 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.ite 
ms/d04588t.pdf. 
297. GAO, HIGHLIGHTS (Mar. 2011), http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11289high.pdf. 
298. Id.; see also GAO, Food Safety: Agencies Need to Address Gaps in Enforcement 
and Collaboration to Enhance Safety of Imported Food, GAO-09-873 (2009), http://www.gao.g 
ov/new.items/d09873.pdf. 
299. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 370. 
300. See Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law 
Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 208 (2010) (strength-
ening consumer protection through Congressional delegation to state enforcement power 
under the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008). 
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goals for all, along with an effective mechanism of coordination and 
budgetary support. 
In light of the FSMA and FSWG, as mandates from both the Presi-
dent and Congress prioritizing food safety, along with the possibility of 
new laws concerning GM crops and ingredients, these goals should em-
body a precautionary approach, which would be more aligned with the 
new proactive policy. Rather than waiting to see if GMOs are proven to 
be unsafe—at which point it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impos-
sible, to turn back the clock, due to the lack of labeling or traceability to 
enable withdrawal of these substances—it would make more sense to 
require labeling and segregation from non-GM foods at the outset. 
Moreover, a strict regulatory structure that would order additional stud-
ies and pre-screening for approval, as well as post-market monitoring, 
would be most prudent. Doing so would also signal to our overseas coun-
terparts that the United States is serious about the recent emphasis on 
food safety and expects foreign suppliers to comply with the inspection 
and certification requirements imposed on them under the new U.S. 
law. By enacting regulations more in harmony with international law in 
the area of GMOs, the government would be opening foreign markets to 
U.S. agricultural products, thereby strengthening international trade as 
well as the FSMA. Thus, U.S. policy would appear consistent and recip-
rocal with the international community.
301
 
B. Industry/Academic Partners with Expertise to Leverage  
Knowledge and Information 
Are agencies being co-opted by the companies they are charged to 
regulate?
302
 Or are they simply not asking the right questions? Given 
the conflicts of interest in university research and the fact that agencies 
rely on the research data provided by companies who have a disincen-
tive to truly investigate and seek out potential problems, is anyone 
studying the long-term effects of GMOs? 
These troubling questions stem in large part from a systemic prob-
lem. The FDA and other agencies in this area do not do their own re-
search, but rely instead on information provided by the companies they 
regulate who are seeking approval of the drugs and food products they 
produce or seek to bring to market.
303
 Each agency focuses only on its 
                                                     
301. Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 373–75. For example, major U.S. grain compa-
nies recently rejected genetically modified grains not yet approved by foreign markets, an-
nouncing they would only accept grain approved for commercial use in the European Union, 
as they fear any trace of the biotech grain in shipments could shut off export markets. See 
Christine Stebbins & Karl Plume, Update 3—US Grain Cos Tighten GMO Policy, Eye Syn-
genta Corn, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOil 
News/idAFN1E78017Q20110902?sp=true. 
302. See Widman, supra note 300, at 179–90 (studying Consumer Product Safety 
Commission as an example of agency capture by industry or an industry-sympathetic execu-
tive branch, the agency’s weakened enforcement, and Congress’ statutory response). 
303. See Aoki, supra note 9, at 465. 
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own narrow charge without viewing the broader scope of food safety, 
and they lack the scientific expertise to comprehend the real potential 
impact of GM crops on the environment or even raise the most relevant 
concerns.
304
 In the GM industry, an added problem arises from the type 
of patent protection granted to companies such as Monsanto, Pioneer, 
and Syngenta. This protection enables these firms to require that all 
users of their products sign end-user agreements that, in addition to 
protecting intellectual property, also forbid the use of any seed for inde-
pendent research; as a result, the company controls all research on GM 
seeds, including which information gets published.
305
 
This situation is particularly challenging in view of the obvious 
conflicts of interest. Moreover, even assuming honest and complete re-
porting despite the self-interest, there is another more subtle and hid-
den hindrance. Monsanto and other companies only answer the ques-
tions asked by the government, construed as narrowly as possible while 
still technically in compliance, and do not investigate any more compre-
hensively or through their own independent queries because any an-
swers or findings would be information they would have to disclose to 
the government.
306
 For this reason, the questions that are asked by the 
government to which the company must respond become critical. Yet the 
FDA and other government agencies (including the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in the securities industry) often cannot attract the 
best and brightest scientists and lawyers to ask these important and 
complex questions, given the fact that professionals in the biotech com-
panies are more highly paid than those in the FDA and are generally 
given more intellectually stimulating work. Thus, for the research being 
used to support government approvals, these studies and investigations 
into some of the most crucial and fundamental issues are in essence not 
being done. 
How can government agencies attract top talent and expertise giv-
en the tremendous salary differential between government and private 
industry that is unlikely to be bridged, although often partially offset by 
a more favorable lifestyle and benefits? 
A possible solution might be reached from creatively leveraging 
outside talent. When the FDA or another government agency is investi-
gating a problem or issue, it could convene an advisory panel of several 
outside experts—scientists or academics, as well as organizational and 
industry members who do not have a conflict of interest as a competitor 
or other financial stake. This type of advisory panel would differ from 
those chartered by the USDA in the past, and recently announced for 
                                                     
304. See id. at 469 (arguing for a renewed regulatory focus on genetically engineered 
crops). 
305. Id. at 470; see also Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra 
note 274, at 302–03. 
306. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 9, at 469 (noting that “the voluntary nature of partic-
ipation in some of the regulation creates absolutely no incentive for companies to do addi-
tional research or have consistent reporting mechanisms because of the potential for unfa-
vorable data to emerge”). 
2012] THE ROLE OF COURTS, AGENCIES, AND 
CONGRESS IN GMOS 
317 
 
renewal, which have been comprised only of industry representatives 
rather than scientific or academic experts.
307
 In addition, the govern-
ment and panel should focus on encouraging individuals to ask a broad-
er range of appropriate questions under the circumstances. This ap-
proach may not prompt the company to be more forthright in its an-
swers, but by making the right inquiries a more relevant and compre-
hensive picture may emerge. Particularly in this climate of budget cuts 
and financial stringency, an increase in salaries for FDA and USDA sci-
entists is not a realistic option. However, through the creation of adviso-
ry boards, the government may be able to invite eminent scientists to 
ask the questions critical to obtaining essential information. Such 
boards could be impaneled on a permanent basis with rotating member-
ship, or for a finite period in order to focus on a particular issue, investi-
gation, or food/drug approval. Attracting experts to participate in these 
panels should not be difficult, as participation would constitute a pres-
tigious honor, without committing the government to expend further 
limited financial resources. This is likely even more true if the govern-
ment taps faculty and experts from land grant universities, at which it 
is part of the institutional mission to help the public and contribute to 
the common good, and panel service might fulfill contractual responsi-
bilities or otherwise be rewarded through tenure and promotion. 
In view of the conflict of interest in university research, due in 
large part to the fact that the academic community involved in research 
is predominantly tied to funding by the industries and the patents they 
seek to develop, great care must be given to the choice of academic panel 
members.
308
 On a broader level, are universities being usurped by corpo-
rations in a myriad of other ways? If so, including members of these 
universities on an advisory panel would not help and might even com-
pound the problem. Thus, the government must be very careful in the 
selection process to thoroughly ascertain any ties to private industry so 
as to ensure that the individual does not double count as an industry 
representative. The success of these panels hinges on vigilant and 
transparent investigation as to who is taking each seat, full disclosure of 
                                                     
307. For example, the USDA recently announced a committee to examine “the full 
spectrum of issues faced by the fruit and vegetable industry. The committee also advises the 
Secretary on how USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) can tailor its programs to 
better meet the needs of the fruit and vegetable industry.” News Release, USDA, USDA 
Calls for Nominations to Recharter Fruit and Vegetable Industry Advisory Committee (June 
27, 2011), http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateDta.do?template=Template 
U&navID=&page=Newsroom&resultType=Details&dDocName=STELPRDC5091735&dID=
151352&wf=false&description=USDA+Calls+for+Nominations+to+Recharter+Fruit+and+Ve
geble+Industry+Advisory+Committee&topNav=Newsroom&leftNav=&rightNav1=&rightNa
v2=. It will be comprised of “up to 25 representatives from the nation’s fruit and vegetable 
industry to serve two-three-year terms.” Id.; see also Bottemiller, supra note 83 (reporting 
that Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack will reestablish advisory committees “to review tools 
and options available to farmers on all sides of the issue”). Presumably these representatives 
would also be exclusively from the industry, as has been USDA’s model in the past. 
308. See Strauss, Ethical Implications, supra note 13, at 32–33. 
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which constituencies are represented, and proper apportionment of rep-
resentation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the area of GM foods, the courts have stepped in to fill the void 
left by regulatory agencies and, in doing so, have assumed part of the 
role that was originally intended for these agencies. As demonstrated by 
the Supreme Court opinion in Monsanto, involving GM alfalfa, the 
courts may be reaching the inherent limits of judicial review. An explo-
ration of these cases provides another reason for further, though more 
stringent and specific, federal legislation: Agencies following the vague 
standards that apply to the agricultural industry generally are not ade-
quately policing GMOs. This analysis demonstrates the need for a sepa-
rate and specific statute and regulations that pertain to GM crops, given 
the already established dangers of pollen drift shown by these incidents 
and lawsuits. Ultimately, piecemeal lawsuits are not the way to regulate 
our food supply, especially given the reactive, rather than proactive, na-
ture of most tort suits.
309
 
Moreover, now that Congress has effectively spoken through the 
FSMA—the first substantial change in food law in 70 years—the effect 
of this law on the role of the courts and federal agencies in this area 
must be consistent. As a first significant step toward improving food 
safety, the time is ripe for a reassessment of other areas of food regula-
tion. A precautionary approach towards GMOs would be more in keep-
ing with the new mandate for the FDA to prioritize prevention in the 
area of food safety. “[A] strict regulatory structure that would mandate 
additional studies and pre-screening for approval, as well as post-
market monitoring,” would fit harmoniously with the new proactive pol-
icy.
310
 
Until Congress exercises its oversight and provides clear statutory 
guidance, the courts in appropriate cases will need to scrutinize agency 
action and give their full consideration to the public policy issues engen-
dered by GMOs. Other stakeholders, particularly trade associations and 
suppliers, organic and conventional farmers, and consumers, will also 
need to remain vigilant in their demands for a proactive regulatory re-
gime, and avoid becoming complacent. In an area of such increasing sci-
entific and socioeconomic complexity, a unified multilateral approach is 
clearly warranted. Governmental units and experts must work together 
to study the long-term human health and environmental effects of 
GMOs and prevent further contamination and extinction of non-GM 
crops. Until these effects are known, mandatory labeling, monitoring, 
and segregation of crops would be the most prudent approach to protect 
the integrity and security of the food supply. 
                                                     
309. See Strauss, Legal Liability Risks, supra note 18, at 174–77 (offering proposals 
for industry and the stakeholders that would limit of the risk of regulation by litigation). 
310. See Strauss, FSMA, supra note 1, at 374; see supra note 301 and accompanying 
text. 
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With the new focus on preventative measures, this is an opportune 
time to make meaningful change in the area of biotechnology and food 
safety standards. Policymakers should capitalize on momentum sparked 
by the congruent interests of a broad range of government bodies, in-
cluding agencies, the courts, and Congress, as well as industry and aca-
demic experts, to work toward the best public policy approach for ensur-
ing food safety in the United States. 
   
 
 
